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BETTER NOT CALL SAUL: THE IMPACT OF CRIMINAL 
ATTORNEYS ON THEIR CLIENTS’ SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT 
TO EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
Veronica J. Finkelstein 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The critically-acclaimed American crime drama television series 
“Breaking Bad” is populated with memorable characters.  Among 
those characters is sleazy lawyer Saul Goodman, a character 
introduced in the second season of the mega-hit series.  Goodman is a 
criminal attorney under any definition of the term.  He is both a 
lawyer who defends criminals, and a lawyer who, himself, is engaged 
in the criminal activity of his clients.
1
  As the series unfolds, 
Goodman is shown assisting his clients in drug conspiracies.  
Specifically, Goodman launders the financial proceeds from his 
clients’ methamphetamine distribution operation in an effort to 
conceal their illegal activities.   
Although Breaking Bad is fiction, there are real criminal lawyers 
whose cases seem to have been taken from the pages of a Breaking 
Bad script.  Although the Supreme Court of the United States (the 
Court or Supreme Court) has not yet granted certiorari to review a 
case involving the Sixth Amendment implications of a criminal 
lawyer, lower courts have been have convicted and sentenced 
lawyers for behavior not unlike that of Goodman.  For example, on 
January 22, 2014, attorney R. Christopher Reade of Las Vegas pled 
guilty to laundering approximately $2.25 million that his client 
fraudulently obtained in an online investment scheme.
2
  In his plea 
agreement, Reade admitted not only to laundering the money but to 
making misrepresentations to regulators in an effort to conceal the 
fraud.
 3
   
Reade is far from the only lawyer accused of involvement in a 
criminal conspiracy with a client.  Prominent New Jersey criminal 
 
    Ms. Finkelstein is an Assistant United States Attorney in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
and an Adjunct Professor of Law at the Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law, Emory 
University School of Law, and the Rutgers School of Law–Camden.  This article constitutes her 
personal work product and any opinions expressed herein are her personal opinion and not the opinion 
of the United States Department of Justice.  
 1. For the remainder of this Article, the term “criminal attorney” refers to lawyers who are 
involved in the criminal activities of its clients. 
 2. Jeff German, Las Vegas Lawyer Pleads Guilty in Money Laundering Scheme, LAS VEGAS 
REV. J., Jan. 23, 2014, at B003.   
 3. Id.   
1
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defense lawyer Aaron Denker pled guilty to laundering money from 
his clients’ drug sales.4  Denker was alleged to have accepted large 
sums of illegally obtained funds from his clients.  Denker then 
converted those funds to money orders in smaller amounts, in an 
effort to evade detection.  Following his conviction, Denker was 
disbarred from practicing in the State of New Jersey.
5
   
Boston criminal defense lawyer Robert A. George was sentenced 
to three and a half years in prison for laundering $200,000 on behalf 
of a former client.
6
  At the same time that he was appearing as a 
defendant, George was serving as defense counsel to a client accused 
of operating a gambling ring.
7
  Following his conviction, George 
withdrew from representation.
8
  His sentence was subsequently 
affirmed.
9
  
Unfortunately, as these cases illustrate, the criminal attorney is no 
mere fictional concept limited to a television series like Breaking 
Bad.  Although many attorneys would never dream of doing the acts 
Reade, Denker, and George were convicted of doing, there are true 
“criminal lawyers” in practice.  Attorneys like Reade, Denker, and 
George not only served as counsel to their clients, but these attorneys 
either pled guilty to, or were found to have conspired in, their clients’ 
crimes.   
This criminal behavior raises serious ethical implications,
10
 and 
may violate the applicable rules of professional conduct.
11
  
Importantly, the actions of a criminal attorney may violate a client’s 
 
 4. Larry Lewis, Lawyer Hit with Fine and Prison, THE PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 6, 1996, at B03.   
 5. In re Denker, 147 N.J. 570, 570 (1997).   
 6. Brian Ballou, Lawyer is Given 3½ Years in Jail; George Stands by Innocence Claim, THE 
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1, 2012, at B4, B41; Tom Egan, Robert George’s Criminal Convictions Upheld, 
MASS. LAW. WEEKLY, July 30, 2014.   
 7. Cape & Islands District Attorney DA O’Keefe Won’t be Charged in Federal Investigation, 
MASS. LAW. WEEKLY, June 28, 2012.   
 8. Id.   
 9. U.S. v. George, 761 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2014).   
 10. See Beets v. Collins, 65 F.3d 1258, 1270 (5th Cir. 1995) (“Conflicts between a lawyer's self-
interest and his duty of loyalty to the client . . . fall along a wide spectrum of ethical sensitivity from 
merely potential danger to outright criminal misdeeds.”); Cerro v. U.S., 872 F.2d 780, 788 (7th Cir. 
1989) (“The purpose of the ethical duty to disclose potential conflicts is to ensure conflict-free 
representation.”).  Although the ethical issues are significant, they are not the focus of this article.   
 11. ABA Model Rule 1.7, the general rule regarding current conflicts of interest, states as 
follows: 
Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation 
involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the 
representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a 
significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the 
lawyer’s responsibilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal 
interest of the lawyer. 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009). 
2
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constitutional rights.  In specific, when an attorney co-conspires with 
his client and then defends that client at trial, the attorney’s conduct 
raises issues that may implicate his client’s Sixth Amendment rights.   
The Sixth Amendment provides various safeguards to criminal 
defendants.  Among those guarantees is that of a fair trial.
12
  This 
guarantee has been deemed to include, with some limitations, 
representation by competent and conflict-free counsel.
13
  
Competency issues can take a variety of forms, from an attorney who 
fails to call a key witness to testify,
14
 to an attorney accused of 
sleeping through a cross examination.
15
   
Conflict issues, in contrast, generally arise where an attorney 
represents multiple clients, either concurrently or successively.  The 
most common situation that gives rise to a conflict of interest 
concerns occurs when an attorney concurrently represents two 
defendants who are both accused of a related crime.  For example, if 
two defendants are accused of conspiring to rob a bank, and one 
attorney is appointed to represent both defendants at trial, the 
representation would be considered concurrent joint representation.  
When concurrent joint representation occurs, the attorney’s loyalty 
may be unavoidably and impermissibly divided between his two 
clients.  For this reason, concurrent joint representation has been 
scrutinized because a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
may be jeopardized.   
The Sixth Amendment’s coverage, however, is not strictly limited 
to circumstances of concurrent joint representation of co-defendants.  
The Sixth Amendment also applies to other types of conflicts, 
including those created when an attorney represents a client with 
whom the attorney formerly himself conspired.  As argued herein, an 
attorney who is a participant in a criminal conspiracy will, by nature 
of his own divided loyalties and interest in self-preservation, be 
unable to provide effective representation to his client.   
Although the Supreme Court has not yet recognized this type of 
 
 12. The Sixth Amendment provides: 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an 
impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which 
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense. 
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 13. Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 90 (1955); Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 69–70 (1942); Avery 
v. Ala., 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940); Powell v. Ala., 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932). 
 14. Branch v. Sweeney, No. 13-1657, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 13006, at *20–*23 (3d Cir. July 9, 
2014).  
 15. Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 624–25 (6th Cir. 2011).   
3
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conflict as one requiring automatic reversal, such a rule is appropriate 
for a myriad of reasons.  Arguably, there can be no higher loyalty 
than to one’s self.  As this article posits, an attorney’s inherent desire 
for self-preservation creates a conflict so serious that it justifies the 
adoption of an automatic reversal rule.  Indeed, at least one federal 
circuit has regularly applied an automatic reversal rule to this type of 
case.   
The Supreme Court has not yet granted certiorari to review a case 
involving the Sixth Amendment implications of a criminal attorney 
but such a case is likely to soon present itself.  When that time 
comes, the Supreme Court will have a unique opportunity to clarify, 
expand, or curtail its ineffective assistance of counsel jurisprudence.  
A criminal attorney cannot provide effective assistance of counsel 
because the attorney’s loyalties are irreparably divided.  For the 
reasons described herein, there are valid reasons for the Supreme 
Court to impose an automatic reversal rule in cases where an attorney 
represents a client co-conspirator in a trial relating to their joint 
crime.  To reach this conclusion, this Article will first explore the 
scope and development of the Court’s ineffective assistance of 
counsel jurisprudence.  With that in mind, Part III of this Article will 
assess the true nature of various types of conflicts.  Part IV of this 
Article explores the jurisprudence of the Second Circuit, which 
employs an automatic reversal rule in circumstances of a co-
conspiring attorney.  Finally, Part V of this Article argues that an 
automatic reversal rule, like the rule utilized in the Second Circuit, is 
justified in cases where an attorney represents a co-conspirator client.   
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The Sixth Amendment guarantees all criminal defendants a fair 
trial.
16
  Beginning with Powell v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held 
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment included a 
guarantee of the right to assistance of counsel.
17
  As part of this 
guarantee, a defendant accused of a crime is entitled to the assistance 
of counsel during key stages of the litigation.
18
  This right attaches in 
 
 16. U.S. CONST. amend VI.   
 17. Maureen R. Green, Comment: A Coherent Approach to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Claims, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1516, 151 (1983).   
 18. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 
771 n.14 (1970).  The appropriate focus of any Sixth Amendment analysis is on the integrity of the 
adversarial system which includes the assistance of competent, conflict-free counsel.  See Wheat v. U.S., 
486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).   
4
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all federal and state criminal prosecutions in which the defendant is 
accused of a felony or certain serious misdemeanors.
19
   
Although other substantive rights are also guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment, the assistance of counsel has always been a key 
constitutional protection.
20
  In a long line of cases culminating in 
Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court recognized that assistance of 
counsel is necessary to protect the fundamental right to a fair trial in 
criminal cases.
21
  Because assistance of counsel is so fundamental to 
ensuring the validity of the adversarial system, “defendants cannot be 
left to the mercies of incompetent counsel.”22  As the Court noted, the 
assistance of counsel is not only a protection provided by the Sixth 
Amendment, but absent this safeguard, “justice will not be done.”23   
The right to counsel is fundamental for a variety of reasons.  First, 
the typical defendant is unfamiliar with the law, has no facility with 
the rules of procedure, and is ill-prepared to rebut the charges leveled 
against him by the prosecution.
24
  Without the assistance of counsel, 
a defendant may be wrongfully convicted based on legal error or 
faulty evidence.
25
   
Second, the stakes are high.  In a criminal case where the death 
penalty or a lengthy incarceration looms as potential penalties, one 
misstep in a defense can be the difference between life and death.
26
  
Given the severity of the penalties, criminal cases are ones where 
counsel’s assistance is particularly important.   
Third, assistance of counsel is one method of guaranteeing a broad 
spectrum of protections.  A criminal defendant is entitled to various 
protections under the constitution including, inter alia, the right to 
confront witnesses, to trial by jury, and to be speedily tried.
27
  The 
defendant may not be aware of these and other rights.  Even if he is 
 
 19. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37–38 (1972) (affirming that the right applies to 
serious misdemeanors); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (affirming that the right 
applies to felonies).   
 20. See U.S. v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 (1981) (noting the importance of defense counsel in 
assuring the adversary criminal process is fair); U.S. v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973) (noting that the 
assistance of trial counsel is a core purpose of the Sixth Amendment).   
 21. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339–40; see also Adams v. U.S. ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 
(1942); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Powell, 287 U.S. at 68.   
 22. McMann, 397 U.S. at 771. 
 23. Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462. 
 24. Mark W. Shiner, Conflicts of Interest Challenges Post Mickens v. Taylor: Redefining the 
Defendant’s Burden in Concurrent, Successive, and Personal Interest Conflicts, 60 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 965, 969 (2003).   
 25. See Johnson, 304 U.S. at 463 (discussing the risks inherent in the deprival of assistance of 
counsel) 
 26. Id.   
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.   
5
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aware, the lay defendant may not understand how to assert these 
rights.  It is through counsel that the defendant’s other substantive 
constitutional rights are protected.
28
   
Finally, the right to counsel ensures the trial not only is fair but 
appears fair to the outside world.  In many ways, public perception is 
paramount to the functioning of the justice system.  Ensuring that all 
defendants have appropriate access to effective counsel bolsters the 
validity of the adversarial system itself.
29
   
For these and other reasons, apart from a few narrow exceptions, 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is absolute.
30
  Counsel is so 
fundamental, that it is guaranteed regardless of the defendant’s 
economic status.  For this reason, counsel must be appointed in 
criminal cases to represent defendants who would otherwise be 
unable to pay.
31
  Where a defendant is entitled to counsel at trial, if 
that counsel is absent, the defendant’s conviction is generally subject 
to automatic reversal.
32
   
Simply being in the courtroom during trial, however, is 
insufficient.  An attorney defending a client in a criminal case has a 
significant obligation.  Counsel must be more than a potted plant; his 
mere presence does not constitute the constitutionally guaranteed 
level of assistance.
33
  To meet the requirements of Gideon, counsel 
must also be effective.
34
  Among other requirements, counsel must 
act in a manner that is objectively reasonable and that does not 
detrimentally prejudice the outcome of the case.
35
  If present counsel 
does not fulfil this role properly, the defendant’s conviction may 
subsequently be reversed.
36
  As the Court has noted, however, 
surmounting the high bar to prove ineffective assistance is not an 
 
 28. See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 179 n.1 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Of all the 
rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for 
it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.”)   
 29. Hadassah Reimer, Legal Ethics: Stabbed in the back, but no adverse effect, Mickens v. 
Taylor, 122 S. Ct. 1237 (2002), 3 WYO. L. REV. 329, 332 (2003).   
 30. Jeffrey Scott Glassman, Note: Mickens v. Taylor: The Court’s New Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell 
Policy for Attorneys Faced with a Conflict of Interest, 18 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 919, 923–24 (Summer, 
2004); Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 42 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 525, 567 (2013) 
(noting that waiver must be knowing and intelligent); see also Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 163 (1988) 
(noting that even waiver by the defendant must be viewed with scrutiny due to the integral nature of 
assistance of counsel to the adversarial system).  
 31. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). 
 32. Id. at 339.   
 33. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984). 
 34. Id. at 686; Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 (1980); Avery v. Ala., 308 U.S. 444, 446 
(1940). 
 35. Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 476-77 (U.S. 2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688). 
 36. U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).   
6
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easy task.
37
  The attorney need only act “within the range of 
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.”38   
When evaluating whether counsel was effective, and therefore 
ensured due process protections to the defendant, the focus is the 
integrity of the adversarial system.
39
  Where that integrity has been 
detrimentally impacted, the defendant’s constitutional rights may 
have been violated.   
When a defendant was represented by an attorney who failed to 
provide effective assistance, the defendant may be entitled to post-
conviction relief if his constitutional rights have been violated.
40
  A 
claim for post-conviction relief is a powerful claim; if the defendant 
is successful he may be entitled to a new trial.  For this reason, as one 
commentator has noted, ineffective assistance claims are some of the 
most frequently raised claims in both state and federal post-
conviction petitions.
41
 
The Court has not considered a conflict case where the conflict 
arose from a criminal attorney representing his co-conspirator client.  
The Court has addressed ineffective assistance claims in two primary 
contexts:  conflicts of interest and attorney performance.
42
  The Court 
first set the parameters for ineffective assistance of counsel claims in 
Glasser v. United States.  The Court further honed its rules through a 
line of conflict of interest cases, including Holloway v. Arkansas, 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, and Wood v. Georgia.  The Court articulated a 
different rule in its attorney performance cases, including the notable 
decisions in Strickland v. Washington and United States v. Cronic.  In 
Mickens v. Taylor the Court’s most recent decision addressing the 
conflict of interest inherent in successive representation, the Court 
attempted to reconcile its prior cases.  To date, Mickens remains the 
Court’s final word on ineffective assistance claims in the context of 
conflicts of interest.   
 
 37. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010). 
 38. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970). 
 39. Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988). 
 40. Anne Bowen Poulin, Conflicts Of Interest In Criminal Cases: Should The Prosecution Have 
A Duty To Disclose?, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1135, 1137 (2010).   
 41. Eve Brensike Primus, Procedural Obstacles to Reviewing Ineffective Assistance of Trial 
Counsel Claims in State and Federal Postconviction Proceedings, 24 CRIM. JUST. 6, 6 (2009).   
 42. Other contexts include conflicts between the attorney and the judge, an employer and 
employee, or between multiple attorneys representing discrete interests.  See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 
U.S. 776 (U.S. 1987) (two attorneys from the same firm representing co-defendant); Wood v. Georgia, 
450 U.S. 261 (1981) (counsel was retained and paid by the employer on behalf of defendant employees); 
U.S. v. Sayan, 968 F.2d 55, 64 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (counsel feared reprisal from the judge due to actions 
taken to defend his client).   
7
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A. The Court set the parameters for ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims in Glasser v. United States.  
The Court first addressed the parameters of a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel in the landmark case of Glasser v. United 
States.
43
  In Glasser, the trial court appointed defendant Glasser’s 
attorney to represent Glasser’s co-conspirator, defendant Kretske, 
notwithstanding Glasser’s objection to the joint representation.44  At 
trial, the attorney zealously advocated for Kretske while foregoing 
trial strategies that would have been detrimental to Kretske and 
beneficial to Glasser.
45
  In specific, the attorney failed to cross-
examine a witness whose testimony was used to link Glasser to the 
conspiracy.
46
  The attorney also failed to object to arguably 
inadmissible evidence.
47
  Glasser, Kretske, and other co-conspirators 
were all convicted.
48
   
On review, the Court found that the trial court’s failure to provide 
Glasser with the assistance of an “undivided” attorney violated 
Glasser’s Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.49  
The Glasser court declined to apply the harmless error standard, 
adopting a standard more lenient to defendants.   
Instead the Glasser Court merely required that the concurrent joint 
representation had prejudiced Glasser.  Although the Court noted that 
“nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice” were unnecessary in 
light of the fundamental deprivation of constitutional rights, the 
Court nonetheless engaged in a factual analysis to find some 
evidence of actual prejudice.
50
  The Court noted, inter alia, that the 
attorney’s representation of Glasser “was not as effective as it might 
have been” but for the conflict posed by the concurrent joint 
representation.
51
  The Court ultimately set aside the verdict below 
and granted Glasser a new trial.
52
   
In Glasser, the Court had an opportunity to announce a bright-line 
rule and to declare unconstitutional an attorney’s concurrently 
representation of co-defendants.  The Court elected not to do so.  
Instead, the Court permitted concurrent joint representation.   
 
 43. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).   
 44. Id. at 68–69.   
 45. Id.   
 46. Id. at 72–73.   
 47. Id. at 73–74.   
 48. Id. at 63.   
 49. Id. at 75–76.   
 50. Id. at 76.   
 51. Id.  
 52. Id.  
8
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The Court not only permitted concurrent joint representation to 
occur, but suggested that this type of representation might be a valid 
strategic choice by the defendant.  As noted in Justice Frankfurter’s 
dissent in Glasser, “[j]oint representation is a means of insuring 
against reciprocal recrimination.  A common defense often gives 
strength against a common attack.”53  The Glasser Court also 
determined that judicial economy weighed in favor of permitting, at 
least in some circumstances, concurrent joint representation.   
Inherent in the Glasser decision was the Court’s presumption that 
serving two masters does not create an automatic, unavoidable 
division of loyalties.  By declining to prohibit all concurrent joint 
representation, the Court recognized that, in some cases, an attorney 
serving two masters may have divided loyalties but, in other cases, 
there may be no division of loyalties.  This presumption manifests 
itself in the Court’s future conflict jurisprudence, as is further 
discussed herein.  Had the Glasser Court announced a bright-line 
rule, the problem posed by a criminal attorney may have never 
manifested.  Nor would prejudice have been injected into the 
analysis.  Instead, the Glasser Court held that only certain divided 
loyalties, those resulting in prejudice, rose to the level of ineffective 
assistance at trial.   
In addition to declining to adopt a bright-line rule, the Glasser 
Court failed to announce a specific test to measure prejudice.  The 
Glasser Court also declined to determine the specific amount of 
prejudice necessary for reversal.  After the Glasser decision, it 
appeared that a showing of some amount of prejudice was necessary 
for a defendant to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim.  How 
much prejudice or how such prejudice should be proven was unclear.   
Following Glasser, the lower courts varied in their approaches to 
ineffective assistance of counsel claims.  Lower courts primarily 
diverged as to the specific amount of prejudice a defendant had to 
show to prevail on an ineffective assistance claim.  Some courts held 
that the mere potential for prejudice was sufficient to constitute 
ineffective assistance of counsel.
54
  Other courts applied the 
reasonable doubt standard, evaluating the record for evidence of a 
conscious, knowing decision by all defendants to enter into joint 
representation.
55
  Yet other courts required a showing of actual 
prejudice.
56
  Still others applied different standards depending on 
 
 53. Id. at 92 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).   
 54. See, e.g., U.S. ex rel. Hart v. Davenport, 478 F.2d 203 (3d Cir. 1973). 
 55. See, e.g., Lollar v. U.S., 376 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
 56. See, e.g., U.S. v. Lovano, 420 F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1970); Lott v. U.S., 218 F.2d 675 (5th Cir. 
1955).   
9
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when the ineffective assistance claim was raised.
57
  For example, in 
Washington state courts, if the claim was raised at the time counsel 
was appointed, the defendant only needed to articulate the possibility 
of prejudice.
58
  If the claim was raised post-trial, actual prejudice 
needed to be shown from the trial court record.
59
  In the years after 
Glasser was decided, there was little consistency among lower courts 
evaluating ineffective assistance claims in the context of concurrent 
joint representation.   
B. The Court further honed its rules through a line of conflict of 
interest cases, including Holloway v. Arkansas, Cuyler v. 
Sullivan, and Wood v. Georgia.   
Between 1978 and 1981, the Court considered three major conflict 
of interest cases, which extended the reasoning set forth in Glasser.  
First, in Holloway v. Arkansas, the Court adopted an automatic 
reversal rule for timely raised concurrent joint representation 
conflicts.  Second, in Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Court articulated a 
different, two-part “actual conflict” test for untimely raised 
challenges.  Third, in Wood v. Georgia, the Court extended the 
Holloway automatic reversal rule to cases where the trial court had a 
duty to inquire into a conflict even in the absence of a timely 
challenge.  These three major cases served as the basis for years of 
litigation relating to concurrent joint representation conflicts.   
1. In Holloway v. Arkansas, the Court adopted an automatic 
reversal rule for timely raised concurrent joint representation 
conflicts.  
The Court further refined the parameters of a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel in a case of concurrent joint representation in 
Holloway v. Arkansas.  In Holloway, the trial court appointed a single 
public defender to represent three defendants who were each charged 
with rape.
60
  Prior to trial, the attorney moved for the appointment of 
separate counsel for each defendant.
61
  In support of his motion, he 
described the potential for prejudice, noting that due to the 
concurrent joint representation he could learn confidential 
information from one defendant that would create a conflict of 
 
 57. See, e.g., State v. Kennedy, 508 P.2d 1386 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).   
 58. Id. at 1389.   
 59. Id.  
 60. 435 U.S. 475, 476–77 (1980). 
 61. Id. at 477.  
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interest in terms of his representation of another defendant.
62
  The 
attorney argued that the defendants themselves had articulated to him 
the possibility of a conflict of interest.
 63
    
Notwithstanding this argument, the motion was denied and the trial 
court required the attorney to represent all three defendants.
64
  Prior 
to jury selection and again before presenting the defense case in 
chief, the attorney requested a severance.
65
  The trial court denied 
each request.
66
  The defendants were convicted.
67
    
On review, the Holloway Court held that the trial court’s failure to 
inquire into the potential conflict and appoint separate counsel not 
only amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, but that such a 
failure mandated automatic reversal.
68
  The Holloway Court noted 
that, “the mere physical presence of an attorney does not fulfill the 
Sixth Amendment guarantee when the advocate’s conflicting 
obligations have effectively sealed his lips on crucial matters.”69   
The Holloway Court attempted to create consistency in ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims going forward.  Citing the Glasser 
decision, the Holloway opinion noted the divergent approaches 
among lower courts faced with ineffective assistance claims.
70
  The 
Holloway Court read the Glasser decision “as holding that whenever 
a trial court improperly requires joint representation over timely 
objection[,] reversal is automatic.”71   
The Holloway Court, however, declined to rule on the standard 
applicable to all attorney conflict claims, deciding only the standard 
applicable when the challenge to concurrent joint representation was 
made by counsel before trial.
72
  The Holloway Court did not decide 
that its automatic reversal rule would apply where the conflict was 
never raised before the trial court.  Nor did it consider any 
applications arising from a criminal attorney.   
Importantly, the Holloway Court decided that, at least for 
objections raised before trial, no specific amount of prejudice need be 
proven.  In fact, the Holloway Court determined that, at least in some 
cases, no prejudice need be proven at all.  Instead, the Holloway 
 
 62. Id. at 467–77. 
 63. Id. at 477. 
 64. Id. at 488.   
 65. Id. at 478.   
 66. Id.   
 67. Id. at 481.   
 68. Id. at 488.  
 69. Id. at 490.  
 70. Id. at 483–84.  
 71. Id. at 488. 
 72. Id. at 484.  
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Court held that reversal is automatic wherever a trial court compels 
concurrent joint representation over a timely, pre-trial objection by 
the attorney.
73
  In essence, the Holloway Court determined that 
certain types of conflicts create a per se violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.  One category of those types of conflicts were cases like 
Holloway, where counsel affirmatively raises the conflict and the trial 
court declines to inquire into the matter.   
In its reasoning, the Holloway Court noted the difficulty 
encountered by a defendant who is faced with having to prove actual 
prejudice to be entitled to post-conviction relief.
74
  As the Holloway 
Court noted, the inherent danger in a conflict of interest situation is 
not what the attorney does, which can be shown from the record, but 
rather what the attorney refrains from doing as a result of his divided 
loyalties.
75
  On the record, there is no way to know what options, 
tactics, and decisions were considered and rejected due to the 
conflict.
76
  In recognition of the impossibility of proving prejudice 
post hoc, the Holloway Court simply obviated any need for such a 
showing, at least where an objection to the concurrent joint 
representation was timely raised pre-trial.   
Instead, the Holloway Court held that where the objection was 
timely raised, the conflict requires automatic reversal, without a 
showing of prejudice or an adverse effect.  The mere possibility of 
conflict, however remote, is sufficient and no prejudice need be 
proven.  Since the Holloway decision was issued, the Court has 
consistently held that a trial court has a duty to ascertain if there is a 
conflict in two situations:  first, when the issue is timely raised by a 
litigant; or second, where the potential for conflict is readily 
apparently to the trial court based on the record at trial.
77
  In either of 
these two situations, if the trial court fails to ascertain the effect of 
the conflict, reversal is automatic without any need for the defendant 
to prove prejudice from the trial court record.   
In its Holloway decision, the Court carefully limited its holding to 
the facts of Holloway—namely a concurrent joint representation 
conflict raised before trial.  By reserving for another day the issue of 
untimely objections to concurrent joint representation, the Holloway 
Court tacitly endorsed the Glasser reasoning that serving two masters 
sometimes creates an unavoidable, automatic division of loyalties but 
 
 73. Id. at 488–89.  
 74. Id. at 490–91. 
 75. Id.  (internal citations omitted).  
 76. Id. at 496. 
 77. Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 159–60 (1988); Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 272–73 
(1981).   
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that, at other times, creates an potential for conflict that never ripens 
into an actual conflict.   
At its essence, the Holloway Court focused more directly on the 
obligations of the trial court to evaluate matters presented to it than 
the actual nature of a conflict of interest.  By focusing on the trial 
court’s failure, the Holloway Court sidestepped an opportunity to 
consider whether all concurrent joint representation conflicts might 
give rise to an automatic right to reversal.  By limiting its decision to 
only timely, pre-trial objections, the Holloway Court reserved 
judgment as to the question of how much prejudice needed be shown 
to prove actual divided loyalties under other circumstances.   
2. In Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Court articulated a different, two-part 
“actual conflict” test for untimely raised challenges. 
In Cuyler v. Sullivan, the Court was presented with the issue it had 
declined to rule upon in Holloway, namely the necessary strength of 
any showing of an actual conflict of interest where an objection is 
first raised post-trial.  The Sullivan Court drew a clear, bright line 
between timely and untimely challenges to concurrent joint 
representation.  The Sullivan Court left intact its Holloway decision.  
As a result, where a challenge is lodged pre-trial, reversal is 
automatic with no showing of prejudice required.  In contrast, the 
Sullivan Court held that where a challenge is lodged post-trial, the 
defendant must show actual prejudice.   
In Sullivan, a pair of privately-hired attorneys represented three co-
defendants who were all accused of murder.
78
  Neither the co-
defendants nor their attorneys objected to this representation at trial.
79
   
The first defendant to be tried was Sullivan.
80
  The evidence 
against Sullivan was largely circumstantial.
81
  Sullivan himself never 
testified and the defense chose not to present a case.
82
  Sullivan was 
convicted and sentenced to life in prison.
 83
  The other two defendants 
were each separately tried and acquitted.
84
  Sullivan appealed his 
conviction, which was affirmed.
85
   
Defendant Sullivan raised an objection to the concurrent joint 
 
 78. 446 U.S. 335, 337 (1980).   
 79. Id. at 337–38.   
 80. Id. at 338.   
 81. Id.   
 82. Id.  
 83. Id.  
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 338–40.   
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representation only after he was convicted and his co-defendants 
were acquitted.
86
  During this phase of litigation the two trial 
attorneys gave conflicting accounts of their roles at the trial.
87
  At 
least according to certain testimony, one attorney jointly represented 
multiple defendants.
88
    
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit 
granted Sullivan a reversal of his conviction.
89
  Citing Holloway and 
other cases from within the circuit, the Third Circuit held that “actual 
prejudice or conflict of interest need not be shown” because even a 
remote possibility is sufficient.
90
  Without guidance to the contrary 
from the Supreme Court, the Third Circuit simply applied the 
Holloway rule without considering whether this rule was applicable 
in light of the untimely challenge to the concurrent joint 
representation by Sullivan.   
On review, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the Third 
Circuit applied the wrong standard.  As an initial matter, the Sullivan 
Court distinguished Holloway, reasoning that:   
Holloway requires state trial courts to investigate timely 
objections to multiple representation.  But nothing in our 
precedents suggests that the Sixth Amendment requires state 
courts themselves to initiate inquiries into the propriety of 
multiple representation in every case.  Defense counsel have an 
ethical obligation to avoid conflicting representations and to 
advise the court promptly when a conflict of interest arises 
during the course of trial.  Absent special circumstances, 
therefore, trial courts may assume either that multiple 
representation entails no conflict or that the lawyer and his 
clients knowingly accept such risk of conflict as may exist.
91
 
In so reasoning, the Sullivan Court declined to hold that the 
Court’s Holloway automatic reversal rule was applicable under the 
facts presented in the Sullivan case.   
The Sullivan Court instead articulated a new, two-part test.  Under 
this test, the defendant had the burden to show that the conflict 
adversely affected one or more actions taken by the attorney at trial.
92
  
The Sullivan Court concluded that where no timely objection is 
 
 86. Id. at 338.   
 87. Id.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id. at 340.   
 90. U.S. ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 519–20 (3d Cir. 1979).   
 91. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 346–47. 
 92. See id. at 348–50.  
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raised, a defendant must show:  first, that there was an actual conflict 
of interest; and second, that this conflict adversely affected the 
attorney’s performance.93   
The Sullivan Court provided scant explanation of this new test.  In 
their concurring opinions, Justices Brennan and Marshall attempted 
to further delineate the test’s parameters.  Citing ethics rules, Justice 
Marshall defined an actual conflict as one that created a divergence 
between the attorney and client regarding “a material factual or legal 
issue or to a course of action.”94  As to the second prong of the test, 
less guidance was provided.  Noting that something more than a mere 
potential for divergence between the attorney and client was 
necessary, the concurring Justices concluded that the defendant must 
prove that the attorney “actively represented” competing interests.95   
Although the test was imprecisely defined by the majority 
decision, one thing was made apparent by the Sullivan Court—where 
a challenge to joint representation is untimely raised, some amount of 
prejudice, in the form of an “adverse effect” must be shown.  
Reversal is not automatic in this context.  The Sullivan Court held 
that if a defendant shows that his attorney actively represented 
conflicting interests and that the conflict had an adverse effect on the 
attorney’s performance, reversal is warranted.  The Sullivan Court 
distinguished this standard from the one the Court articulated in 
Glasser, and failed to explain the substantive difference between the 
two standards.
96
   
In so holding, the Sullivan Court, at least in part, resolved the 
divergence in the circuits created by its Glasser decision.  Where 
prejudice need be shown, all that needed to be proven was an 
“adverse effect” relating to a material issue.  In this way, although 
departing from its automatic reversal rule in Holloway, the Sullivan 
Court nonetheless set what appeared to be a low bar for defendants 
challenging concurrent joint representation.  The Sullivan test 
became known as the “actual conflict” test.  To meet this test, a 
defendant must prove some actual impact caused by the conflict, 
albeit perhaps less impact than a different verdict at trial.   
By articulating the “actual conflict” test without overruling the 
Holloway automatic reversal rule, the Sullivan Court created a bright-
line distinction between timely and untimely challenges to concurrent 
joint representation.  In so holding, the Court tacitly endorsed the 
 
 93. Id. at 348. 
 94. Id. at 356 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 95. Id. at 351 (Brennan, J. and Marshall, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 
Glasser v. U.S., 315 U.S. 60, 72–75 (1942)). 
 96. See id. at 348–50.  
15
Finkelstein: Better Not Call Saul:  The Impact of Criminal Attorneys on their
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015
1230 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83 
concept that some conflicts are so severe as to unavoidably taint 
representation, whereas other conflicts are less severe.  The 
distinction between the Holloway rule and Sullivan test has no 
specific grounding in the due process clause itself, but arose instead 
from the Court’s apparent belief that different types of conflicts and 
challenges to representation require different treatment.  In cases of 
an untimely challenge, a showing of some minimal prejudice is 
required.  The required showing is less burdensome than in other 
types of assistance of counsel cases, but more than in the case of a 
timely-raised objection under Holloway.
97
  In cases where an 
objection was timely raised no prejudice need be shown.  Reversal in 
such a case is automatic.  The distinction based on the timing of the 
challenge was one created by the Court, not one evident in the Sixth 
Amendment itself.   
The Court may have also had practical concerns at heart.  The 
Sullivan test created a scheme in which new trials were far less likely 
to be granted than under Holloway, decreasing the chances that a trial 
verdict would later be disturbed by a Sixth Amendment challenge.  
The Sullivan Court made clear to trial courts that the power to 
prevent constitutional challenges to verdicts was, in large part, in the 
hands of the trial court itself.  If a challenge was raised, the trial court 
had an obligation to act.  If the challenge was untimely raised, the 
obligation was on the defendant to make more of a showing to justify 
reversal.  Unfortunately for litigants, however, the Sullivan Court 
made it far more difficult for a conviction to be overturned if counsel 
failed to timely challenge a representational conflict.   
The Court also endorsed reasoning that seemingly rendered it quite 
easy for a defendant to prove an entitlement to reversal.  In the case 
of a timely challenge, the mere challenge was sufficient.  In the case 
of an untimely challenge, reversal was not automatic but it required 
some showing of actual prejudice.  By adopting the Sullivan test 
without overruling Holloway, the Court implied a continued belief 
that conflicts of interest pose serious threats to the right to assistance 
of counsel.  The Sullivan Court established different standards for 
different types of conflict challenges.   
 
 97. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692–93 (1984) (comparing the higher burden for 
attorney performance cases to the lower burden articulated in Sullivan). 
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3. In Wood v. Georgia, the Court extended the Holloway automatic 
reversal rule to cases where the trial court had a duty to inquire 
into a conflict.   
Less than a year after Sullivan was decided, the Court decided 
Wood v. Georgia.98  The defendants in Wood were employees of an 
adult theater and bookstore who were changed with distributing 
obscene materials.
99
  Due to the defendants’ employment relationship 
with the adult bookstore, the bookstore agreed to retain an attorney 
for the defendants and to pay the attorney’s fees and any fines.100  
There was no evidence to suggest that the defendants objected to this 
arrangement.
101
   
As agreed, the bookstore arranged for an attorney.
102
  The 
defendants were convicted and sentenced.
103
  The attorney did not 
argue in favor of a reduced sentence.
104
  Instead, he lodged an 
unsuccessful constitutional attack.
105
  As part of their sentence, each 
defendant was issued a fine.
106
  The fines were within the bookstore’s 
ability to pay, but exceeded the defendants’ ability to pay.107    
The bookstore then reneged on the agreement to pay the fines.
108
  
The defendants did not themselves pay, arguing that they were 
unable to pay.
109
  This set of circumstances created a situation 
wherein the institution of fines could be challenged on the basis of 
the equal protection clause.
110
  To some observers, it appeared that 
the bookstore and attorney were primarily interested in creating a 
“test case” to litigate constitutional issues of importance to the 
bookstore.
111
  Actual defense of the defendants seemed secondary, if 
a factor at all.   
The Wood case was truly novel in several ways.  Unlike Holloway 
and Sullivan, the conflict in Wood was not caused by concurrent joint 
representation, at least not entirely.  Instead, the conflict was between 
the defendant and a third-party paying the defendant’s legal fees.  
 
98. 450 U.S. 261 (1981). 
 99. Id. at 263.   
 100. Id. at 266.   
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 267.   
 103. Id. at 263.   
 104. Id.  at 272. 
 105. Id.  
 106. Id. at 263. 
 107. Id. at 264. 
 108. Id. at 267.   
 109. Id. at 264.   
 110. Id. at 266–67.   
 111. Id.  at 267. 
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This conflict manifested in the attorney, who was torn between the 
defendants and the bookstore.   
In addition, the facts of Wood presented a scenario somewhere on 
the spectrum between the facts of Holloway and Sullivan in terms of 
the timeliness of the disclosure of conflict.  Unlike in Holloway, there 
was no timely pre-trial objection to the representation.  Unlike in 
Sullivan, however, there was a sufficient record before the trial court 
to heavily suggest a conflict.  The attorney’s entire course of 
conduct—his very litigation strategy—suggested that he was serving 
a master other than the defendants.   
On review, the Wood Court held that the trial court knew or should 
have known about the attorney’s conflict of interest due to the 
attorney’s disclosures and conduct during trial.112  This holding 
signaled an apparent change from the reasoning in Sullivan.  Indeed, 
the Wood Court focused on the fact that, during the trial, the 
prosecution noted that a conflict of interest might be created due to 
counsel’s fee arrangement.113  Finding the facts more akin to 
Holloway than Sullivan, the Wood Court reasoned that trial court 
knew or should have known about the potential conflict of interest.
114
  
Because the trial court failed to inquire, the Wood Court held that the 
appropriate remedy was reversal, and granted new proceedings 
“untainted . . . by conflicting interests.” 115  The Wood Court 
extended the Holloway automatic reversal rule beyond the context of 
timely pre-trial challenges to cases where the trial court had a duty to 
inquire.   
In many ways, the Wood decision reinforced the rules articulated 
in Holloway and Sullivan.  In deciding Wood, the Court left the 
Sullivan test intact but created a new category of cases where the 
Holloway automatic reversal rule applied—cases where a conflict 
should have been apparent to the trial court.  Although no timely 
objection to the representation was made in Wood, the conflict was 
patent to the trial court.  By contrast, in Sullivan, no unusual 
circumstances would have made the trial court aware of the conflict.  
In its Wood decision, the Court expanded the application of the 
Holloway rule to cases of timely objection or where the trial court 
had a duty to inquire into conflict.  The Sullivan rule, in contrast, 
applied to untimely objections and cases where the trial court had no 
reason to inquire.   
The Wood case was the first conflict case decided by the Court 
 
 112. Id. at 272–73.   
 113. Id. at 273, n.20.   
 114. Id. at 273–74.   
 115. Id.  
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where the conflict was not one of concurrent joint representation.  
The conflict, instead, was one between the competing interests of an 
employer and employees.
116
  By aligning the facts of Wood with 
those of Holloway, the Court seemingly acknowledged that conflicts 
other than those of concurrent joint representation can be serious 
enough to warrant automatic reversal.  The Wood decision reinforced 
the extent to which the Court acknowledged that attorney conflicts 
can irreparably taint a defendant’s case.   
C. The Court articulated a different rule in its attorney 
performance cases, including the notable decisions in Strickland 
v. Washington and United States v. Cronic.   
After Glasser, with the exception of Holloway, Sullivan, and 
Wood, the Court primarily considered ineffective assistance claims 
arising from circumstances other than joint representation.  These 
cases involved ineffective assistance caused not by attorney conflicts 
of interests but instead by attorney performance.  In Chambers v. 
Maroney, for example, the Court considered whether an attorney was 
ineffective due to the fact that the attorney met his client on the way 
to the courthouse on the eve of trial, leaving no time for advance 
preparation.
117
  In Estelle v. Williams, an ineffective assistance claim 
was grounded in the attorney’s failure to object to an order requiring 
the defendant to wear prison garb during trial.
118
  Ineffective 
assistance claims were raised relating to the attorney’s professional 
qualifications,
119
 health,
120
 pre-trial performance,
121
 trial 
 
 116. There was also concurrent joint representation in Wood, although the conflict concerning the 
Wood Court was not this conflict but rather the conflict created by the employer’s retention of counsel 
for the defendants.    
 117. 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970).   
 118. 425 U.S. 501, 502 (1976).   
 119. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bergman, 599 F.3d 1142, 1151, 1159–60 (10th Cir. 2010) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing to determine the attorney’s competency and for a new 
trial if the attorney was deemed incompetent where the attorney was unlicensed at the time of trial); U.S. 
v. Watson, 479 F.3d 607, 610–12 (8th Cir. 2007) (denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial where 
his trial counsel’s license was suspended during trial); Young v. Runnels, 435 F.3d 1038, 1043 (9th Cir. 
2006) (affirming the trial court’s denial of a new trial where trial counsel was subsequently disbarred); 
U.S. v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 886–87, 891 (2d Cir. 1990) (reversing the trial court’s denial of the 
defendant’s petition for vacation of the judgment of conviction where trial counsel had fraudulently 
obtained admission to the New York State Bar).   
 120. See, e.g., Ivory v. Jackson, 509 F.3d 284, 294–95, 298 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming the trial 
court’s denial of a new trial where the defendant alleged that his trial counsel used drugs and alcohol 
during trial); U.S. v. Eyman, 313 F.3d 741, 742–44, 745 (2d Cir. 2002) (affirming the defendant’s 
conviction and sentence where trial counsel failed to call an expert witness to testify); Frye v. Lee, 235 
F.3d 897, 907–08 (4th Cir. 2000) (dismissing an appeal where the trial attorney consumed alcohol but 
not to the extent that it impacted his performance at trial); Johnson v. Norris, 207 F.3d 515, 518, 521 
(8th Cir. 2000) (affirming a judgment where trial counsel was bipolar); Dows v. Wood, 211 F.3d 480, 
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performance,
122
 and post-trial performance.
123
   
A separate line of authority from Glasser developed specifically to 
address ineffective assistance claims relating to attorney 
performance.  In Strickland v. Washington, the Court articulated a 
“but for” causation test that applies in the case of deficient attorney 
performance.  In United States v. Cronic, the Court concluded that 
certain performance could be so deficient as to require automatic 
reversal.  In important ways, these decisions reinforced many of the 
Court’s implicit assumptions that underpin the Court’s conflict of 
interest jurisprudence.  Although reinforcing many of its prior 
assumptions, the Court developed an entirely different standard for 
attorney performance cases than it had applied to the conflict 
situations in Holloway and Sullivan.   
1. In Strickland v. Washington, the Court articulated a “but for” 
causation test that applies in the case of deficient attorney 
performance.   
The attorney performance standard was first articulated by the 
Court in Strickland v. Washington.
124
  In Strickland, the Court 
considered whether there had been ineffective assistance based on an 
attorney’s tactical decision not to pursue certain litigation 
 
485–86, 488 (9th Cir. 2000) (denying habeas corpus relief where trial counsel was subsequently 
diagnosed with advanced Alzheimer’s disease).   
 121. See, e.g., Thomas v. Horn, 570 F.3d 105, 121–22, 130 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming the trial 
court’s guilt-phase determinations, but vacating the trial court’s order for sentencing relief and 
remanding for an evidentiary hearing concerning the impact, if any, of the attorney’s failure to 
investigate mitigating evidence); Virgil v. Dretke, 446 F.3d 598, 613–14 (5th Cir. 2006) (reversing 
judgment against the defendant and ordering that he be re-tried or released where trial counsel failed to 
strike jurors who admitted they could not be fair and impartial); James v. Harrison, 389 F.3d 450, 456–
57 (4th Cir. 2004) (affirming the trial court’s judgment denying a new trial where the defendant’s 
attorney was absent during voir dire and jury selection because he relied on the attorneys representing 
co-defendants); Mello v. Dipaulo, 295 F.3d 137, 145–47, 151 (1st Cir. 2002) (denying habeas corpus 
relief where trial counsel failed to investigate the use of expert testimony); Hughes v. U.S., 258 F.3d 
453, 462–64 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversing and remanding for a new trial where the defendant’s attorney 
failed to challenge a venireperson who admitted bias). 
 122. See, e.g., Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 688, 701–02 (2002) (reversing and remanding where 
trial counsel made a strategic choice not to deliver a closing argument); Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 
U.S. 365, 385, 391 (1986) (affirming the circuit court’s determination that the defendant received 
ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel failed to timely challenge key evidence against the 
defendant).   
 123. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534–38 (2003) (reversing and remanding for a 
new sentencing hearing where trial counsel failed to present mitigating evidence during the sentencing 
phase); Glover v. U.S., 531 U.S. 198, 203–05 (2001) (reversing and remanding for a new sentencing 
hearing where trial counsel failed to object to the defendant’s convictions being combined, which 
increased the defendant’s overall sentence).   
 124. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).   
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strategies.
125
  In Strickland, against the advice of his court-appointed 
trial attorney, defendant Washington waived his right to a jury at 
sentencing and pled guilty to capital murder.
126
  In an effort to 
prevent damaging evidence from being admitted during the 
sentencing phase, Washington’s attorney did not prepare a 
presentence report and did not call Washington or any other 
witnesses to testify during the sentencing hearing.
127
  In the absence 
of scant mitigating evidence, Washington was sentenced to death.
 128
  
Washington subsequently challenged his conviction on the basis that 
his attorney was ineffective for failing to undertake additional 
investigation to determine whether a psychiatric defense might have 
been viable and effective.
129
   
On review, the Strickland Court distinguished ineffectiveness 
claims alleging deficient attorney performance from those alleging a 
conflict of interest.  In the case of attorney performance, the 
Strickland Court held that prejudice needed be proven to a degree 
more significant than it had required in Sullivan.  The Strickland 
Court characterized the Sullivan test as a “not quite per se rule of 
prejudice.”130  Although the Sullivan test required that the defendant 
show only an actual conflict and adverse effect, the Strickland test 
required that the defendant show actual prejudice.  In essence, under 
the Strickland test the defendant must show that “but for [his 
attorney’s actions], the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.”131  This standard is considerably higher than the standard 
in Sullivan.  Under the Sullivan test, the defendant need show only 
some prejudicial effect, not an entirely different outcome.   
In addition, the Strickland Court ruled out the application of the 
Holloway automatic reversal rule to attorney performance cases.  The 
Strickland Court, citing Sullivan, concluded that prejudice may only 
be presumed in conflict of interest cases.
132
  In attorney performance 
cases, the Court could not generally begin with the presumption of 
ineffective assistance, as it was entitled to do in conflict cases that fit 
the facts of Holloway and Wood.   
In its Strickland decision, the Court articulated a very different 
presumption in an attorney performance case as compared to conflict 
 
 125. Id. at 673. 
 126. Id. at 672.   
 127. Id. at 673.   
 128. Id. at 675.   
 129. Id. at 678–79.   
 130. Id. at 692. 
 131. Id. at 694.   
 132. Id. at 692.   
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cases.  In so doing, the Court distinguished conflicts of interest from 
virtually all other issues giving rise to ineffective assistance 
claims.
133
  In conflict cases, at least those like Holloway and Wood, 
the conflicted representation created a presumption of ineffective 
assistance as the starting point of the Court’s analysis.   
In cases of attorney performance, on the other hand, the Court 
announced a starting presumption that the attorney’s performance 
was adequate.
134
  In Strickland, the Court articulated this 
presumption as a belief that the attorney’s strategy and tactics fell 
“within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance” unless 
the defendant is able to show deviation from the general standards of 
attorney practice.
135
  Moreover, the defendant has the added burden 
of proving that for the attorney’s deficient performance, the result of 
the proceeding would have been different.
136
  In specific, the 
Strickland Court held that a claim for ineffective assistance due to 
attorney performance had two elements:   
First, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was 
deficient.  This requires showing that counsel made errors so 
serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.  Second, the 
defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced 
the defense.  This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so 
serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable.
137
   
Applying this new test to the facts before it, the Strickland Court held 
that Washington had not met his burden to show causation and was 
not entitled to reversal under the Sixth Amendment.
138
   
The Strickland test sets a high bar for defendants.  Although 
ineffective claims have been sustained where an attorney’s 
performance was so deficient that it was as though he was absent 
through major phases of trial,
139
 defendants frequently fail to make 
the necessary but for showing of prejudice.
140
  Under the Strickland 
 
 133. Heidi Reamer Anderson, Funding Gideon’s Promise by Viewing Excessive Caseloads as 
Unethical Conflicts of Interest, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 421, 438 (2012). 
 134. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 135. Id.  See also Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (per curiam).   
 136. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698; see also Sanjay Chhablani, Disentangling The Sixth Amendment, 
11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 487, 542–43 (2009).   
 137. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.   
 138. Id. at 698–701.   
 139. See, c.f., U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984).  
 140. See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364 (1993) (no ineffective assistance claim proven 
where counsel failed to object based on later overruled case law); Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989) 
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standard, the defendant must show more than mere prejudice.  The 
defendant must show prejudice that has more than “some conceivable 
effect on the outcome”—the prejudice must have “more likely than 
not altered the outcome.”141   
In sum, the Strickland test, which is applied to most ineffective 
assistance claims, contains a much higher standard than the standard 
articulated in Holloway and Sullivan.  In so holding, the Court 
indicated its belief that conflicts generally pose a more serious risk to 
a defendant than even the most bumbling attorney performance.   
2. In United States v. Cronic, the Court concluded that some 
attorney performance could be so deficient as to require 
automatic reversal.   
On the same day the Court decided Strickland, it also decided a 
second ineffective assistance case with starkly different facts and 
ultimate outcome.  In United States v. Cronic, the Court delineated 
certain circumstances in which an automatic reversal rule would 
apply to attorney performance cases.
142
  Defendant Cronic and two 
other defendants were indicted on mail fraud charges relating to a 
scheme involving an alleged shell corporation.
143
  At trial, Cronic’s 
inexperienced and newly-appointed attorney presented no defense.
144
  
Instead, the attorney cross-examined the government’s witnesses in 
an effort to establish both that the corporation was not a shell and that 
defendant Cronic did not control the corporation.
145
  Cronic was 
nonetheless convicted.
146
   
The Cronic Court began its analysis by acknowledging that a 
complete denial of counsel would violate the Sixth Amendment.
147
  
The Cronic Court then noted that there are certain circumstances 
where “the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully competent one, 
could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption of 
prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the 
 
(no ineffective assistance claim proven where the defendant was preventing from talking with his 
attorney during parts of the trial); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 795–96 (1987) (no ineffective 
assistance claim proven where the defendant claimed his counsel failed to investigate potentially 
mitigating evidence); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986) (no ineffective assistance claim proven 
where the defendant claimed his counsel refused to present certain testimony at trial). 
 141. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693–94. 
 142. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658–62. 
 143. Id. at 649–51.   
 144. Id. at 649, 651. 
 145. Id. at 651. 
 146. Id. at 650.   
 147. Id. at 659.   
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trial.”148  The Cronic Court further reasoned that the Sixth 
Amendment would also be violated “if counsel entirely fails to 
subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial 
testing. . . .”149  The Cronic Court did not further define what would 
constitute a meaningful lack of adversarial testing, nor did it present a 
method of distinguishing such from mere litigation strategy.   
On the evidence before the Court, the Cronic Court could not 
determine if the tactics utilized at trial had rendered counsel 
ineffective.  Although skeptical that Cronic would prevail, the Court 
nonetheless remanded the case for further evaluation by the circuit 
court.
150
  The Court left open the possibility that a combination of 
factors, including the limited trial preparation time, relative 
inexperience of the attorney, and complexity of the case made it 
possible that Cronic could successfully prove that he was deprived 
effective assistance of counsel.
151
    
As part of its instructions on remand, the Cronic Court noted that a 
reversal was not warranted simply because an attorney is 
inexperienced.
152
  The Cronic Court instead concluded that only in 
extreme circumstances—where there has been a complete 
miscarriage of justice—could prejudice be presumed.153   
Although perhaps not present under the facts of Cronic, the 
Court’s reasoning in Cronic left open the possibility that an attorney 
might perform in a way that is so below-standard that it is akin to no 
representation at all.  If the attorney’s performance was that deficient, 
automatic reversal would be required.  Although the Cronic facts did 
not rise to that level, the Cronic Court did not foreclose the 
possibility of such a case arising under different facts.  Accordingly, 
no evaluation of prejudice is necessary in an attorney performance 
case where the performance is so deficient that it is equivalent to no 
representation at all.
154
   
Although not applied with total uniformity, the reasoning of 
Cronic has been applied to a variety of circumstances where 
 
 148. Id. at 659–60.  
 149. Id.   
 150. Id. at 666–67. 
 151. Id. at 666. 
 152. Id. at 665. 
 153. Id. at 658 fn 24; see e.g., Geders v. U.S., 425 U.S. 80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 
853 (1975); Brooks v. Tenn. 406 U.S. 605, 612-613 (1972); Hamilton v. Ala., 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961); 
White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam); Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961); 
Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475–76 (1945). 
 154. John Capone, Facilitating Fairness:  The Judge’s Role in the Sixth Amendment Right to 
Effective Counsel:  Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162 (2002), 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 881, 883–
84 (2003); Wm. C. Turner Herbert, Off the Beaten Path: An Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Surprising 
Decision in Mickens v. Taylor, 81 N.C.L. REV. 1268, 1270 (2003).   
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prejudice “is so likely that case-by-case inquiry into prejudice is not 
worth the cost.”155  The Cronic automatic reversal rule has been 
applied where, due to a fee dispute with his client, an attorney failed 
to attend a sentencing hearing.
156
  It has also been applied where the 
attorney slept through, or was absent from, critical portions of his 
client’s trial.157  At least according to the circuit courts, these attorney 
performances were so below-standard as to require automatic 
reversal.   
Taken in tandem, Strickland and Cronic illustrated divergent ends 
of a spectrum of attorney performance.  The deficient performance 
contemplated in Cronic was of an extremely rare type—so 
ineffective that the attorney was all but absent.  In such a case, 
prejudice may be presumed, just as it may be presumed under the 
Holloway rule.  Strickland, however, was a more typical example of 
an attorney performance that was adequate if not ideal.  In such a 
case, prejudice need be proven to a high standard in order for the 
defendant to be granted a reversal of his conviction.   
In its Strickland and Cronic decisions, the Court did not disturb its 
conflict of interest jurisprudence.  Instead, the Court articulated a 
new, more stringent standard for reversal in attorney performance 
cases.  The stark difference between the Court’s conflict cases and 
attorney performance cases illustrates that conflicts are very different 
than other challenges facing attorneys.  There is a spectrum of 
deficient performances.  A deficient performance must amount to a 
near total denial of assistance for reversal to be warranted.  Some 
level of deficient performance, therefore, is permissible and does not 
rise to the level of a constitutional violation.  Put more simply, some 
degree of deficient performance is a problem that may be overcome.  
In contrast, there does not appear to be a spectrum of conflicts.  If a 
conflict is present, it may present a constitutional violation. the 
Holloway and Sullivan decisions implied that in many circumstances 
a conflict of interest is a threat that, by its very nature, is unlikely to 
be overcome.   
After Strickland and Cronic were decided, the lower courts were 
left with multiple tests and little guidance from the Court as to when 
each test applied.
158
  Some circuits applied the Sullivan test only to 
 
 155. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). 
 156. Abbamonte v. U.S., 7 Fed. Appx. 58, 57–59 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 157. Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 338, 344–45 (5th Cir. 2001) (en banc); Olden v. U.S., 224 
F.3d 561, 568 (6th Cir. 2000); Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 158. Scott W. Street, Comment, Schwab v. Crosby: Interpreting the Scope of the Supreme Court’s 
Tests for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel and Conflicts of Interest, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 651, 651–
52 (2008) 
25
Finkelstein: Better Not Call Saul:  The Impact of Criminal Attorneys on their
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2015
1240 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 83 
concurrent joint representation cases.
159
  Some circuits applied the 
Sullivan test to all ineffective assistance cases of any type.
160
  Most 
circuits applied the Sullivan test to all conflict of interest challenges 
and the Strickland test only to attorney performance challenges.
161
  
This final group of circuits endorsed a view that conflicts of interest 
pose more serious threats to the defendant than poor attorney 
performance.   
D. More Recently, in Mickens v. Taylor, the Court attempted to 
reconcile its prior cases.   
In 2002, twenty-two years after the Sullivan decision, the Court 
considered the first non-attorney performance ineffective assistance 
case since Sullivan.  In Mickens v. Taylor, a sharply divided Court 
held by a five-to-four majority that a trial court’s failure to inquire 
into an unchallenged conflict of interest did not require automatic 
reversal of the defendant’s conviction.  Instead, the defendant had the 
burden to prove that the conflict of interest adversely affected his 
attorney’s performance.162   
In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia examined and attempted to 
reconcile the holdings of Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood while reining 
in the lower courts’ application of the Sullivan rule. 163  The Mickens 
Court held that in order to demonstrate a Sixth Amendment violation 
in the context of successive representation, the defendant must 
demonstrate prejudice.
164
   
In Mickens, defendant Mickens was accused of sodomizing and 
stabbing seventeen-year-old Hall to death.
165
  Counsel was appointed 
for Mickens by the trial court.
166
  Up until the day of his appointment 
 
 159. See, e.g., Perillo v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 775, 797 (5th Cir. 2000); Caban v. U.S., 281 F.3d 778, 
782 (8th Cir. 2002).   
 160. See, e.g., Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1451 n.7 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 161. See, e.g., Riggs v. U.S., 209 F.3d 828, 831 n.1 (6th Cir. 2000); Atley v. Ault, 191 F.3d 865, 
870 n.4 (8th Cir. 1999); Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 307–08 (2d Cir. 1993); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 
F.2d 576, 579–80 (9th Cir. 1988).   
 162. 535 U.S. 162, 173–74 (2002). 
 163. Id. at 165–76.   
 164. Id. at 166. Successive representation occurs when an attorney serially represents the interests 
multiple two clients who are or may be adverse.  The attorney does not simultaneously represent these 
multiple clients.  A common example of successive representation is when an attorney represents a wife 
in a divorce proceeding and then represents her former husband in a custody case.  By representing the 
husband in the custody battle, the attorney represents a client whose interest may be opposed to his 
former client, the wife.  In contrast, if the attorney represented both the husband and wife, at the same 
time, during the custody case the representation would be joint rather than successive.   
 165. Id. at 164.   
 166. Id.   
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to represent Mickens, the court-appointed counsel had acted as 
defense counsel for Hall in an unrelated criminal case.
167
  The same 
trial court judge presided over the two cases and ordered the 
appointment of counsel.
168
  Neither the trial court judge nor the 
attorney ever disclosed to Mickens the prior representation of Hall or 
the potential for a conflict of interest.
169
  Mickens first learned of his 
attorney’s prior representation of Hall as a result of an inadvertent 
post-trial court disclosure of docketing information.
170
  In this way, 
the Mickens facts highlighted a key problem with the Sullivan 
decision—often a defendant does not become aware of a conflict 
before trial commences.   
After exhausting his direct appeal, Mickens petitioned for a federal 
writ of habeas corpus arguing, inter alia, that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel due to his attorney’s conflict of interest.171  The 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
applied the Sullivan test, requiring that Mickens show an actual 
conflict of interest and an adverse effect.
172
  Although the district 
court found that the judge was on notice and should have inquired 
into the conflict, the district court nonetheless found that Mickens 
failed to meet the Sullivan test.
173
   
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed 
the district court’s decision.174  On rehearing en banc, the Fourth 
Circuit changed course and affirmed the conviction, following the 
reasoning of the district court below.
175
  The Fourth Circuit held that 
Mickens’s failure to meet the Sullivan test meant he was not entitled 
to have his conviction overturned.
176
   
The case was then appealed to the Supreme Court.  In an opinion 
authored by Justice Scalia, the Mickens majority suggested that a 
conflict created by successive representation is a conflict that may be 
overcome.  The majority began by citing Strickland for the general 
rule that a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel had 
an obligation to show prejudice.
177
   
 
 167. Id. at 164–65.   
 168. Id. at 165.   
 169. Id.   
 170. Id.   
 171. Mickens v. Greene, 74 F. Supp. 2d 586, 593 (E.D. Va. 1999).   
 172. Id. at 602–04.   
 173. Id. at 614–15.   
 174. Mickens v. Taylor, 227 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 2000), rev’d 240 F. 3d 348 (4th Cir. 2001) 
(en banc). 
 175. Taylor, 240 F.3d at 361–64. 
 176. Id. at 357-59. 
 177. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166.   
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The majority then noted an exception for cases “when the 
defendant’s attorney actively represented conflicting interests.”178  
Citing Holloway, the majority concluded that there was only a 
requirement of automatic reversal where an attorney timely raises an 
objection to a conflict of interest arising from joint concurrent 
representation and is denied relief.
179
  In so holding, the Mickens 
court limited Holloway and Sullivan even more strictly than they had 
been interpreted.  The Court also set a very high bar for a defendant 
to establish that a conflict adversely affected the representation 
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.   
The majority utilized Mickens to clarify the application of the 
Sullivan test, noting that it has been wrongly applied by courts 
below.
180
  The majority noted that the basis for application of the 
Sullivan test was the Court’s belief that concurrent joint 
representation creates a high probability of prejudice, a presumption 
that the majority opined was not present in other types of conflicts.
181
  
By suggesting that the Sullivan test be limited only to concurrent 
joint representation cases, the Mickens Court called into question the 
prior developed circuit court case law.
182
 
Two justices concurred with the majority opinion.  Justice 
Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, filed a concurring opinion.183  
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy addressed more directly 
the specifics facts of the case as well as the trial court’s duty to 
inquire into a potential conflict of interest.
184
   
Four justices dissented from the majority opinion, filing three 
separate opinions.  Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion.  In his 
opinion, Justice Stevens considered various factors including whether 
Mickens’s attorney had a duty to disclose his conflict, whether 
Mickens had a right to refuse to be represented by conflicted counsel, 
and whether the trial judge had a duty to obtain Mickens’s consent to 
the representation.
185
   In light of the seriousness of the charges, 
Justice Stevens opined that the trial court had an obligation to make 
all inquiries into the attorney’s effectiveness.186  According to Justice 
Stevens, where duties recognized by the criminal justice system have 
 
 178. Id. at 166. 
 179. Id. at 168.   
 180. See id. at 174–75. 
 181. See id. 
 182. See id. at 174–75. 
 183. Id. 176–79.   
 184. Id. at 178–79. (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 185. Id. at 179–180 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 186. Id. at 185–86. 
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been violated, reversal should be mandatory.   
Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion.  In his opinion, Justice 
Souter focused on the trial judge’s obligation to inquire into the 
conflict of interest.
187
  He divided the Court’s prior cases into two 
categories, those where there was a duty to inquire and those where 
there was no duty.
188
  Given the trial court’s knowledge of the 
attorney’s representation of both Mickens and Hall, Justice Souter 
concluded that there had been a duty to inquire.
189
   
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg, filed a dissenting 
opinion.  In that dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer argued in favor of 
automatic reversal rule.
190
  Justice Breyer distinguished the facts of 
Mickens from those of Holloway, Sullivan, and Wood.
191
  According 
to Justice Breyer, because the conflict was egregious, occurred in a 
capital murder case, and was created by the judge—the trial was 
inherently tainted.
192
  According to Justice Breyer, a “categorical rule 
that does not require proof of prejudice in the individual case” was 
warranted.
193
   
The wisdom of the Mickens decision has been questioned.
194
  
Indeed, the sharp division of the court and multiple opinions suggest 
varying methods of analyzing the facts of the case.  A difference in 
swing votes may have resulted in the Court announcing a different 
rule.  The Mickens rule that was announced, however, provided 
additional context to the Glasser line of authority.  Unlike Holloway 
and Sullivan, Mickens did not involve concurrent joint representation 
of multiple defendants.  Rather, Mickens arose from a conflict of 
interest created by successive representation.   
Although there are differences between Mickens and its 
predecessors, there are similarities as well.  Mickens and Holloway 
both involved attorney conflicts of interests.  In Mickens, the conflict 
was not one that created a per se conflict.  In Holloway, the conflict 
was one that created a per se conflict requiring no showing of 
prejudice as grounds for reversal.  Through its Mickens decision, the 
Court seemingly endorsed the implicit reasoning underpinning its 
prior decisions; namely, that some conflicts of interest are 
unavoidable and more serious than other types of conflicts.  Even 
 
 187. Id. at 189 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 188. Id. at 194–95.   
 189. Id. at 207–08.  
 190. Id. at 209, 211.   
 191. Id. at 209–11. 
 192. Id. at 210–11.   
 193. Id. at 211.   
 194. Glassman, supra note 30, at 965–66.   
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after Mickens, however, there remained no clear categorization of 
conflicts into those which are and are not avoidable.   
Although decided in 2002, the Mickens decision was the Court’s 
most recent case addressing the Court’s conflict of interest 
jurisprudence.  Since Mickens was decided, the Court has considered 
only attorney performance cases under the Strickland standard,
195
 
procedural issues,
196
 and the right to counsel more generally.
197
  The 
Court has not revisited its jurisprudence on conflict of interests.   For 
more than a decade, the Mickens decision has been the Court’s final 
word on ineffective assistance claims raised due to a conflict of 
interest.  It is ripe for the Court to revisit issues of attorney conflict of 
interest, especially in light of the apparent proliferation of criminal 
attorneys.   
III. THE TRUE NATURE OF VARIOUS TYPES OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
As these cases illustrate, potential conflicts may take a variety of 
forms, each with different associated risks to the defendant.  Not 
every form of conflict presents a direct conflict between the attorney 
and his client.
198
  Although conflicts take a variety of forms, many 
are positional in nature.
199
   
A positional conflict occurs when an attorney advocates a position 
that is directly contrary to the position taken on behalf of his client.
200
  
Positional conflicts may arise when the attorney appears to represent 
interests misaligned from the interests of his client.  For example, an 
attorney may teach classes to an agency and later defend individuals 
accused of wrongdoing by that agency.
201
  It may appear from this 
 
 195. Hinton v. Ala., 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1089–90 (2014); Burt v. Titlow, 134 S. Ct. 10, 13 (2013); 
Chaidez v. U.S., 133 S. Ct. 1103, 1107–08 (2013); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1405–07 (2012); 
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012); Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315–16 (U.S. 
2012); Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1403 (2011); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104–05 
(2011); Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115, 121–23 (2011); Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 389 
(2010); Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139, 149 (2010); Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 38–40 (2009); 
Wong v. Belmontes, 558 U.S. 15, 16–19 (2009); Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123–28 (2009); 
Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124–26 (2008); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380–81 (2005); 
Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 178–79 (2004); Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5–6 (2003); Wiggins 
v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521–22 (2003); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 22–23 (2002); Bell v. Cone, 
535 U.S. 685, 697–99 (2002). 
 196. Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1917–18 (2013); Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 
621–22 (2005); Massaro v. U.S., 538 U.S. 500, 504–06 (2003).   
 197. U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144–49 (2006).   
 198. Bellamy v. Cogdell, 974 F.2d 302, 308 (2d Cir. 1992).   
 199. R. David Donoghue, Conflict Of Interest: Conflicts of Interest: Concurrent Representation 
11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 319, 320 (1998).   
 200. Jon S. Dzienkowski, Positional Conflicts of Interest, 71 TEX. L. REV. 457, 460 (1993).   
 201. U.S. v. Michaud, 925 F.2d 37, 40–42 (1st Cir. 1991). 
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representation that the attorney does not fully endorse the positions of 
his client because the attorney aligns himself with the agency.  An 
attorney may be running for office and then feel some pressure to 
appear to be “tough on crime.”202  The attorney may feel constrained 
from adopting certain trial tactics which might later be scrutinized 
during the attorney’s campaign.   
Other conflicts are economic.  Where an attorney is paid on a 
contingency fee basis or is to receive a bonus contingent on acquittal, 
there may be an incentive for the attorney to pressure his client to 
reject a plea bargain.
203
  Similarly, where an attorney is paid not by 
his client but rather by a third-party, there may be a conflict between 
the best interests of the client and the third-party.  For example, an 
attorney paid to represent a client drug dealer by the drug supplier 
may pressure the client to reject a plea bargain that would require 
cooperation in the prosecution of the drug supplier.
204
   
Not every conflict, however, is positional or economic.  A conflict 
can arise where outside forces distract the attorney from focusing on 
his client.  An attorney may be under investigation in an unrelated 
matter and may feel an obligation to generally cooperate with the 
government.
205
  The attorney may focus his time and energy on his 
own defense, to the detriment of the client.  An attorney who is 
having an affair with his client’s spouse may develop a personal 
conflict between fighting for his client’s acquittal and permitting the 
client to be incarcerated.
206
  By doing so, the client would become 
less of a competitor for the spouse’s affection.   
Types of potential conflicts are too numerous to list.  Each type of 
conflict poses a different challenge to the attorney’s ability to 
zealously advocate for his client.  Given the variety of different 
conflicts, it is important to develop reliable criteria for distinguishing 
between different types of conflicts.   
One method of evaluating conflicts in a particular situation is to 
determine whether that conflict calls upon the attorney to temper his 
defense of a client.  In other words, analyzing whether the attorney 
may be tempted to “pull his punches” because of other obligations to 
clients, or due to the attorney’s personal interest.207   
 
 202. U.S. v. Horton, 845 F.2d 1414, 1418–21 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 203. Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 309 (2d Cir. 1993).   
 204. Quintero v. U.S., 33 F.3d 1133, 1136–37 (9th Cir. 1994).   
 205. U.S. v. Salerno, 868 F.2d 524, 540–41 (2d Cir. 1989); Roach v. Martin, 757 F.2d 1463, 
1479–80 (4th Cir. 1985).   
 206. U.S. v. Hanoum, 33 F.3d 1128, 113032 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 207. Many of these situations are specifically addressed in ABA Model Rules. See, e.g., MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2013) (confidentiality of information; MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 1.9 (duties to former clients); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 (imputation of 
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Regardless of the type of conflict, in the case of concurrent joint 
representation or successive representation there is a genuine risk that 
the attorney will temper his defense of a client due to the conflict.
208
  
The attorney may be caught between two diametrically opposed 
clients.  The facts of Glasser illustrate the attorney’s connondrum; 
the same evidence was both detrimental to defendant Glasser and 
inculpatory to defendant Kretske.  The attorney could not help both 
of his clients equally.  He had to preference either defendant Glasser 
or defendant Kretske.  Faced with clients who have divergent 
interests, there is a genuine risk that the attorney will preference one 
client over another.  As the Court concluded in Holloway and 
Sullivan, for this reason, concurrent joint representation can be 
detrimental to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to unconflicted 
counsel.   
In important ways, successive representation of multiple 
defendants differs from concurrent representation of multiple 
defendants.  Perhaps this distinction explains why the Mickens 
decision was different than the Holloway and Sullivan decisions.  
Successive representation arises due to prior relationships.  In 
successive representation, conflicts may arise if an two related cases 
are litigated by the same attorney or if the attorney, in defense of one 
client, discloses privileged communications from a different client.
209
  
In cases of successive representation, the attorney’s representation of 
one defendant will have terminated prior to representation of another 
defendant.  The attorney no longer serves two masters 
simultaneously; he serves two masters, one after another.   
As a result, the likelihood of a conflict is decreased, although still 
present.  The facts of Mickens illustrate the potential for conflict.  In 
Mickens, the attorney may have gained information from his 
representation of defendant Hall that suggested the sex was 
consensual, rather than rape.  That evidence would have been 
exculpatory to defendant Mickens—but the evidence was learned 
through the attorney’s representation of Hall.  By disclosing that 
information during Mickens’s trial, to benefit Mickens, the attorney 
might have violated his duty of confidentiality to Hall.  At the time 
the disclosure would have occurred, the attorney’s representation of 
 
conflicts of interest); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.11 (special conflicts for government 
officers and employees). 
 208. Wheat v. U.S., 486 U.S. 153, 160 (1988) (citing Sullivan and noting that a conflict may 
restrain an attorney from challenging the admission of evidence prejudicial to one client but favorable to 
another).   
 209. Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d 576, 580 (9th Cir. 1988).   
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Hall would have been terminated.
210
  Hall would no longer have been 
facing criminal charges and any disclosure could not have impacted 
Hall’s own liberty interests.  At least as to Hall, the attorney-client 
relationship had terminated and the damage of disclosure was 
tempered.   
In contrast, in circumstances of concurrent representation, there are 
simultaneous attorney-client relationships and representations.  If an 
attorney represents two co-conspirators, one guilty and one innocent, 
the concurrent representation constrains the attorney from 
exonerating the innocent client by placing all the blame on the guilty 
client.
211
  The facts of Holloway and Sullivan illustrate well the 
damage that may be caused by concurrent joint representation.  Two 
liberty interests may hang in the balance.   
The potential conflict caused by simultaneously serving multiple 
masters seems inherently riskier, and in many cases is ill-advised or 
even prohibited.
212
  Successive representation is frequently permitted.  
An attorney may be screened from a case so that others in his firm 
can undertake successive representation.
213
  Screening, however, is 
not generally permitted in the case of concurrent representation.
214
  
Concurrent representation cases are most closely scrutinized than 
successive representation cases.
215
  The temptation to divide loyalties 
is simply ever-present.   
An attorney with divided loyalties cannot be a fully effective 
advocate.
216
  Indeed, reflecting this reality, the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure treat concurrent and prior representations 
differently, requiring more involvement by the trial court where there 
is concurrent joint representation.
217
  Although successive 
 
 210. In addition, Hall was deceased.  That may not be what occurs in other cases of successive 
representation.  A client who engages in consensual sex and discloses that fact to an attorney may later 
object to this sex being disclosed publicly in unrelated litigation.  This is especially true where, as in 
Mickens, that sexual activity is stigmatized. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 163 (2002). 
 211. Pamela S. Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation:  The Changing Vision 
of the Right to Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670, 690 (1992).   
 212. David M. Siegel, The Role of Trial Counsel In Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims:  
Three Questions to Keep in Mind, 33 CHAMPION 14, 16 (2009).   
 213. See Donoghue, supra note 199, at 322–23.   
 214. Id.   
 215. Michael Edelman, Ethic: Flatt v. Superior Court of Sonoma County: Attorney Withdrawal 
from Concurrent Representations, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1379, 1382 (1995); Burkhart R. Lindahl, 
Note, Ohio’s New Ethical Screening Procedure, 31 U. TOL. L. REV. 145, 148–49 (1999).   
 216. Patrice McGuire Sabach, Note, Rethinking Unwaivable Conflicts of Interest After United 
States v. Schwarz and Mickens v. Taylor, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 89, 92 (2003).   
 217. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(c).  In fact although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have a 
specific rule for addressing concurrent representation, there are no other rules addressing other types of 
conflicts.  See Mickens, 535 U.S. at 175–76 (discussing the treatment of different conflicts by the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure). 
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representation may have risks, the risks are treated as though they are 
less serious than those that may arise with concurrent representation.   
Setting aside the timing of the representation, the specific nature of 
the conflict is also relevant.  Attorneys face a variety of conflict 
scenarios where it is not unduly difficult to successfully balance 
competing loyalties.  Of the types of conflicts previously noted, the 
following are not typically viewed as inherently threatening:  the 
attorney is paid on a contingent fee basis; the attorney may be called 
to testify at trial; or the attorney represents both an employer and an 
employee with diverging points of view.   
The very cost of trial itself may create financial conflict.
218
  For 
example, in Williams v. Calderon, a potential conflict was created 
where a pro bono attorney had to pay for investigative and 
psychiatric services with the attorney’s own funds.219  His client 
argued that, as a result, the attorney might be tempted to skimp on 
these services even though they might be beneficial to his client’s 
defense.   
Media attention may also cause a conflict between the attorney and 
client.
220
  For example, in Ray v. Rose a conflict was created between 
the attorney’s defense of his client and the fact that the attorney was 
granted the right to sell his client’s life story.221  By discouraging a 
plea and instead going to trial, the attorney might further 
sensationalize the case such that the story would later become a more 
valuable asset.
222
  Notwithstanding this potential for conflict, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit deemed that the 
attorney was able to balance his client’s interests fairly.223   
A direct conflict between the interests of the client and the attorney 
is more serious than those identified in Williams and Ray.  Above all 
else, attorneys must avoid conflicts of interest between themselves 
and their clients.  To avoid such a conflict, ethical rules prohibit 
forms of attorney self-dealing, including:   
(1) negotiating adverse business transactions; (2) self-dealing as 
to gifts or testamentary bequests; (3) obtaining property interests 
 
 218. Lisa R. Pruitt & Beth A. Colgan, Themed Issue: Funding Justice: Justice Deserts: Spatial 
Inequality and Local Funding of Indigent Defense, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 219, 294-296 (2010); See, e.g., 
Buenoano v. Singletary, 963 F.2d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir. 1992); Winkler v. Keane, 7 F.3d 304, 307–10 
(2d Cir. 1993); U.S. v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1980).  
 219. 52 F.3d 1465, 1473 (9th Cir. 1995).   
 220. Tigran W. Eldred, The Psychology of Conflicts of Interest in Criminal Cases, 58 KAN. L. 
REV. 43, 52 (Oct., 2009).   
 221. 535 F.2d 966, 968 (6th Cir. 1976). 
 222. Id. at 973.   
 223. Id. at 973–75.   
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in client's literary or media rights; (4) subsidizing or obtaining a 
proprietary interest in litigation; (5) receiving of unlawful 
referral fees; and (6) negotiating prospective limitations on 
malpractice claims.
224
   
Even more dangerous than these forms of self-dealing are those 
situations where the attorney covertly pursues personal goals to the 
client’s detriment.   
A distracted attorney, more concerned with his own wrongdoing 
than defending his client, might pursue personal goals to his client’s 
detriment.  Where the attorney is at risk of being indicted in an 
unrelated matter than one involving his client, there is a risk that the 
defense of the client may suffer as a result.
225
  The attorney may 
simply lose focus on his client’s case.   
Even worse, the attorney may seek to curry favor with prosecutors 
by sacrificing his client or may prolong his client’s case.  For 
example, in United States v. McClain, an attorney learned during trial 
that he was under investigation by the same prosecutors against 
whom he was defending his client.
226
  The prosecutor and attorney 
discussed delaying the indictment of the attorney until after the 
conclusion of the client’s trial.227  After the client was convicted, the 
attorney was indicted for unrelated charges.
228
  The attorney had a 
clear incentive to delay his client’s trial so the attorney had additional 
time to prepare his own defense against the pending charges.  In 
evaluating these circumstances, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Eleventh Circuit found a conflict sufficient to meet the 
Sullivan standard for reversal.
229
   
As these cases and hypotheticals illustrate, if an attorney 
simultaneously serves two masters, he may be forced to choose 
between competing interests to the detriment of the client.  The 
conflict may, in many cases, be difficult or impossible to avoid.  The 
competent lawyer is one who zealously advocates for the client, and 
prioritizes the client’s interest above all others.  As the Supreme 
Court has noted “[u]ndivided allegiance and faithful, devoted service 
 
 224. Brook K. Baker, Traditional Issues of Professional Responsibility and a Transformative 
Ethic of Client Empowerment for Legal Discourse, 34 NEW ENG. L. REV. 809, 828–29 (2000).   
 225. See, c.f., Thompkins v. Cohen, 965 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding no conflict where 
the attorney was indicted and pled guilty to charges unrelated to his representation of his client); 
Commonwealth v. McCloy, 574 A.2d 86, 91 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (finding no conflict where the 
attorney was the target of a bribery investigation while defending his client on unrelated drug charges). 
 226. 823 F.2d 1457, 1463 (11th Cir. 1987).   
 227. Id.   
 228. Id.   
 229. Id. at 1463–64. 
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to a client are prized traditions of the American lawyer.  It is this kind 
of service for which the Sixth Amendment makes provision.”230  The 
attorney’s duty of loyalty to his client is, therefore, fundamental.  If 
the attorney does not observe his client’s best interests, no one else 
will.  The client’s other substantive rights may be deprived with no 
one to defend him.   
As the Supreme Court has noted, it is precisely this type of 
conflict, between an attorney and his client, where the adversarial 
process may be jeapardized.
231
  It also reflects poorly on the judicial 
system and creates the appearance of unfairness to the public.  It does 
not cause an untoward degree of improperity for the public to learn 
that some attorneys are more competent than others.  There is 
significant impropriety in the public learning that an attorney 
breached his duty of loyalty to a client.  In the area of ineffective 
assistance, public perception is paramount.
232
   
For this reason, in United States v. Ellison, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that a conflict required 
reversal where an attorney, defending himself against malpractice, 
testified against his client.
233
  Noting that the attorney was “not able 
to pursue his client’s best interests free from the influence of his 
concern about possible self-incrimination,” the court held that the 
attorney had breached the most basic of his duties: the duty of loyalty 
to his client.
234
   
For the same reason, the conflict caused by an attorney who 
conspired with his client is equally unavoidable.  The conflict caused 
by dual competing interests is even more serious where the attorney 
and client are co-conspirators.  In such a case, the attorney may find 
his interests pitted directly against his client’s interests.  He still 
serves two masters, himself and his client.   
An attorney whose own self-interests are interjected into his 
client’s case is different than a merely incompetent attorney.  In 
situations where the attorney has himself been indicted or is under 
investigation, the attorney has a self-serving bias in favor of 
protecting his own liberty interests.
235
  Even litigation decisions that 
 
 230. Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 725–26 (1948).  
 231. Chauffeurs, Teamsters & Helpers, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 586–87 (1990) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).   
 232. Galia Benson-Amram, Protecting the Integrity of the Court:  Trial Court Responsibility for 
Preventing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 
425, 442–43 (2004); David Rossman, Conditional Rules in Criminal Procedure: Alice in Wonderland 
Meets the Constitution, 26 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 417, 457 (2010).   
 233. 798 F.2d 1102, 1106–09 (7th Cir. 1986). 
 234. Id. at 1107. 
 235. U.S. v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 157 (2d Cir. 1994).  
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appear to be legitimate may seemingly be motivated by conflict.
236
   
Even worse, the attorney’s decisions may actually be motivated by 
the conflict.  The self-interested attorney may make conscious 
decisions to preference his own cause above his client’s, and may do 
so in a savvy manner which covers any evidence of the decisions.   
The consequences to the attorney are also more significant than 
mere financial considerations; his very life and liberty may be at 
stake.
237
  As one court noted, prejudice is highly probable: 
First, when an attorney is the subject of a criminal investigation 
by the same prosecutor who is prosecuting the attorney’s client, 
there is a high probability of prejudice to the client as the result 
of the attorney’s obvious self-serving bias in protecting his own 
liberty interests and financial interests. The liberty concern at 
issue is avoiding or minimizing imprisonment. The financial 
interests include avoiding disbarment and avoiding termination 
of the attorney’s current representation of the client in question. 
The high probability of prejudice in this situation distinguishes 
this personal interest conflict from the weaker personal interest 
conflicts listed in the dicta in Mickens, e.g., book deals. Second, 
such prejudice is difficult to prove because the client could be 
harmed by the attorney’s actions or inactions that are known 
only to the attorney. In short, the personal interest conflict at 
issue presents comparable difficulties to situations involving 
concurrent representation conflicts.
238
 
The risks posed by a criminal attorney, therefore, are unique and far 
more concerning than the risks associated with more mundane 
conflicts.   
In the case of the criminal attorney, the attorney “cannot be wholly 
free from fear of what might happen if a vigorous defense should 
lead the prosecutor or the trial judge to inquire into his background 
and discover his [own criminal conduct].”239  At every step in the 
litigation, the attorney puts himself in a position where his own 
interests are adverse to the vigorous defense his client.  As the 
Second Circuit has suggested, nothing could be more of a conflict 
than “a concern over getting oneself into trouble with criminal law 
enforcement authorities.”240 
The attorney faces a temptation to make litigation choices that will 
 
 236. U.S. v. DeFalco, 644 F.2d 132,135 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 237. Poulin, supra note 40, at 1162–63.   
 238. Rugiero v. U.S., 330 F. Supp. 2d 900, 906 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (citations omitted). 
 239. U.S. v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 869 (2nd Cir. 1984). 
 240. Id. at 870. 
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increase the chances that the attorney’s own wrongdoing will remain 
undiscovered.  If calling his client to testify might exonerate the 
client but implicate the attorney, the attorney may find it impossible 
to preference the client’s interest over his own.  The attorney maybe 
constrained in a way that jeapardizes the entire justice sustem.  As 
one court noted:    
If there is any constraint on counsel’s complete and exuberant 
presentation, our system will fail because the basic ingredient of 
the adversary system will be missing.  The essence of the 
system is that there be professional antagonists in the legal 
forum, dynamic disputants prepared to do combat for the 
purpose of aiding the court in its quest to do justice.
241
   
If a truly unavaoidable conflict exists under any facts, it is where an 
attorney co-conspirator represents his client.  If an automatic reversal 
rule is appopriate in any case, it should be applied to an attorney co-
conspirator’s defense of his client.   
In its decisions, the Supreme Court has justified its lower threshold 
to show prejudice for conflict of interest cases by observing that it is 
“difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of 
representation corrupted by conflicting interests.”242  
Notwithstanding this fact, the Court rejected a strict rule of 
disqualification primarily because the Court assumed that an attorney 
is “fully conscious of the overarching duty of complete loyalty to his 
or her client.”243  An attorney who participates in a criminal scheme 
with his client, in contrast, may not be so focused on the overarching 
duties of the profession.   
Moreover, cases involving conflicts of interest present a unique 
challenge to a defendant arguing ineffective assistance of counsel.  
The client must both identify a deficiency in his counsel’s 
performance and link that deficiency to a specific action in the 
case.
244
  As the Holloway Court noted, the harm stemming from a 
conflict of interest is often that the conflict causes a lawyer to refrain 
from taking action, rather than that the conflict causes the attorney to 
make an obvious error.  The trial court record does not necessarily 
patently reveal decisions that were not made.  An attorney laboring 
under a conflict may, due to that conflict, fail to aggressively puruse 
 
 241. U.S.  v. DeFalco, 644 F.2d 132, 136 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 242. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).   
 243. Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 784 (1987). 
 244. Recent Cases: Criminal Law. Conflicts of Interest-First Circuit Rules that a Defendant 
Whose Lawyer had a Conflict that the Judge Should Have Known About Must Show Adverse Effect to 
Receive a New Trial, 115 HARV. L. REV. 938, 944 (2002).   
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possible plea negotiations for his client.  Such a failure would not be 
evident from the trial court record.   
Requiring a criminal defendant to demonstrate prejudice in the 
case of a criminal attorney would be unnecessary.
245
   As discussed 
herein, the very nature of the conflict makes effective representation 
impossible.  Such a requirement would also unfairly shift the burden 
to the defendant to prove what may be true but unproveable—that his 
trial attorney made self-interested decisions and did not have his 
client’s sole interest in mind.  The defendant would be forced to 
prove, post hoc, his attorney’s state of mind and thought process.  
Such a showing may, in many cases, be impossible for the defendant 
to make.
246
   Unlike the defendant whose attorney’s incompetence 
can be derived from the record, the defendant represented by a 
criminal attorney may be wholly unable to make a case for reversal 
from the record.   
In at least some cases, the only person with a full understanding 
about the very decisions at issue would be the attorney himself.  The 
client may be unaware that the attorney’s conduct may cause the 
attorney to become an informant and sacrifice the client in an effort 
to procure a more lenient sentence for himself.  The client, 
uneducated in the law and perhaps unaware of the full scope of his 
attorney’s conduct, may simply fail to appreciate the risks posed by 
the representation.   
The client also cannot prove what his attorney contemplated but 
failed to do.  The client may not be able to prove that a choice at trial 
was strategic, self interested, or merely an oversight.  The ability of a 
defendant to prove ineffective assistance would often depend 
exclusively on the attorney’s testimony.  Yet it seems unlikely that an 
attorney accused of ineffective assistance of counsel can be relied 
upon to testify truthfully in post-conviction proceedings.  Empirical 
evidence suggests that trial counsel are reluctant to assist in 
subsequent ineffective assistance claims.
247
  As one commentator has 
 
 245. It may also be unrealistic, given that the client may initially be tacit in accepting the conflict 
posed by the representation.  The client may not initially recognize the risks inherent in such 
representation, and may only later discover or realize that his interests were subjugated to the attorney’s 
own self-interest.  In addition, unless the client is himself a lawyer the client may be unaware of the 
ethical obligations arising from the representation.  The attorney, who is a voluntary member of the 
profession and subject to rules of professional conduct is aware.   
 246. This highlights the inherent challenge facing a defendant who must meet the Strickland or 
Sullivan test.   
 247. See Massaro v. U.S., 538 U.S. 500, 506 (2003) (noting that “[a]ppellate counsel often need 
trial counsel’s assistance in becoming familiar with a lengthy record on a short deadline, but trial 
counsel will be unwilling to help appellate counsel familiarize himself with a record for the purpose of 
understanding how it reflects trial counsel’s own incompetence.”). 
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noted, “there is a direct clash between duty and self-interest.”248  
Self-interest is likely to prevail.
249
   
This problem is heightened in the case of a criminal attorney.  Not 
only will the attorney’s testimony be vital to the defendant’s ability 
to prove ineffective assistance, but the attorney will have an added 
incentive not to testify truthfully.  Not only could such testimony 
impugne the attorney’s legal skills in defending the client, the 
testimony could further reveal the attorney’s wrongdoing.  In cases of 
a criminal attorney, the attorney is a person whose conduct is alleged 
to have been ineffective.  Testifying to assist the client may focus the 
prosecution instead upon the attorney.   
Additionally, the criminal attorney is not your garden variety 
individual who can be trusted to exercise good judgment.  The 
criminal attorney is an individual who has violated ethics rules, 
broken the law, and exercised poor judgment by engaging in criminal 
activity.  He is also an individual who stands much to gain from 
preventing the disclosure of that criminal activity.  In contrast, there 
is little to gain from truthful testimony.  The attorney whose conduct 
was criminal and who now faces exposure can be expected to resist 
any effort to allow the conflict to be fully revealed.   
The potential harm to the client is readily apparent.  It is possible 
that getting his client to accept a plea deal to lesser charges may 
result in the criminal attorney evading conviction or receiving a 
lesser sentence.  This is especially true where the criminal attorney is 
accused of a conspiracy charge.  In such a case, if the client pleas to a 
misdemeanor rather than a felony, the criminal attorney may now be 
less likely to face conspiracy charges with the underlying crime being 
labeled a felony.   
Alternatively, the criminal attorney may curry favor with 
prosecutors by allowing his client to be tried and convicted.  The 
criminal attorney may also have an incentive to lie or to withhold 
evidence that is exculpatory to the defendant but inculpatory to the 
criminal attorney.  Anything that reveals the criminal attorney had an 
involvement in the crime may be inculpatory to him. 
As this discussion highlights, different conflicts effect the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in different ways.  The Supreme Court 
has decided, through its jurispridence, that most Sixth Amendment 
ineffectiveness cases require that the defendant show that his 
 
 248. Eldred, supra note 220, at 75.   
 249. See Lawrence Kornreich & Alexander I. Platt, In this Issue: The Temptation of Martinez v. 
Ryan: Legal Ethics for the Habeas Bar, 8 CRIM. L. BRIEF 1, 2 (2012); Ellen Henak, When the Interests 
of Self Clients, and Colleagues Collide: The Ethics of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 33 AM. 
J. TRIAL ADVOC. 347, 369–70 (2009).   
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attorney’s errors fell below an objective standard of reasonableness 
and prejudiced the case.
250
  Where certain types conflicts are present, 
however, prejudice may be presumed because the conflict so 
dangerously pits the defendant’s interest against other competing 
interests.
251
  The Supreme Court has, through its Holloway and 
Sullivan decisions, determined that concurrent joint representation 
can be one such circumstance.   
The criminal attorney, torn between protecting himself and his 
client, presents another.  When a criminal attorney acts as defense 
counsel, a rule requiring reversal with no need to show prejudice, is 
equally appropriate.  As noted herein, the concept of an automatic 
reversal rule is not absent from the Court’s jurisprudence.  The Court 
has suggested that an automatic reversal rule applies to claims with 
“circumstances that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the 
cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.”252  
The criminal attorney should be numbered among these 
circumstances.   
IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT REQUIRES AUTOMATIC REVERSAL IN 
CRIMINAL ATTORNEY CASES 
The Supreme Court has not yet decided a case where an ineffective 
assistance claim was predicated upon the conflict caused by an 
attorney co-conspirator or criminal attorney.  The Court, therefore, 
has never endorsed the application of an automatic reversal rule to 
this type of conflict.  Indeed, the Court has never applied an 
automatic reversal rule in a conflict case outside the context of 
concurrent joint representation of co-defendants.
253
   
A majority of lower courts have similarly declined to extend the 
Holloway automatic reversal rule.  Courts have generally limited the 
rule to conflicts raised by the concurrent joint representation of co-
defendants in all but one circuit where the issue has been decided.
254
  
In most circuits, even in the context of an attorney who represents a 
 
 250. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686–88, 694 (1984).   
 251. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). 
 252. U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984).   
 253. See, e.g., Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 168 (2002); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 783 
(1987); Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 176 (1986).   
 254. See, e.g., Moore v. Mitchell, 708 F.3d 760, 777 (6th Cir. 2013); McCorkle v. U.S., 325 F. 
App’x. 804, 808 (11th Cir. 2009); U.S. v. Watson, 479 F.3d 607, 611 (8th Cir. 2007); U.S. v. Mota-
Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 45–46 (1st Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Wallace, 276 F.3d 360, 368–69 (7th Cir. 2002); 
Williams v. Calderon, 52 F.3d 1465, 1472–73 (9th Cir. 1995); Beets v. Collins, 65 F.3d 1258, 1268–69 
(5th Cir. 1995).   
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co-conspirator client, the Sullivan test applies.
255
   Only the Second 
Circuit has uniformly extended the automatic reversal rule in conflict 
cases other than those involving concurrent joint representation.
256
  
The Second Circuit acknowledges that certain conflicts of interest 
have the potential to be “so severe that [it is] deemed per se 
[violative] of the Sixth Amendment.”257  Where such conflict is 
present, reversal is automatic with no requirement that prejudice be 
shown.
258
  Courts in the Second Circuit apply an automatic reversal 
rule in two types of cases:  first, in cases where an attorney was 
unlicensed in any jurisdiction at the time of representation;
259
 and 
second, in cases where the attorney is implicated in the defendant’s 
crimes.
260
  That latter circumstance is deemed a conflict of interest 
too significant for a defendant to waive.
261
   
As discussed herein, there are valid reasons for the Second Circuit 
to single out the latter circumstance as one subject to an automatic 
reversal rule.  The Second Circuit has concluded that an attorney who 
has himself conspired in the crimes of his client simply cannot 
provide effective assistance of counsel.  As the Second Circuit has 
noted, an attorney who has engaged in a crime “cannot be wholly 
free from fear of what might happen if a vigorous defense should 
lead the prosecutor or the trial judge to inquire into his background . . 
. Yet a criminal defendant is entitled to be represented by someone 
free from such constraints.”262  As such, in the Second Circuit, there 
is no need to show prejudice where an attorney labored under a 
conflict of interest due to the attorney’s own criminal activity with or 
on behalf of his client.   
 
 255. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mikell, 344 Fed. Appx. 218, 227–29 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying the Sullivan 
test where the prosecutor alleged that defense counsel con-conspired with his client); Mannhalt v. Reed 
847 F.2d 576, 576 (9th Cir. 1988) (granting habeas corpus relief where a client’s attorney inserted 
himself into the trial as a witness); see also U.S. v. Snyder, 707 F.2d 139, 143 (5th Cir. 1983) 
(disqualifying an attorney who was an indicted co-conspirator with his client). 
 256. Although other circuits have declined to adopt additional extensions of the per se rule, courts 
routinely hold that an attorney co-conspirator meets the Sullivan test and has an actual conflict of 
interest.  See, e.g., Perillo v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 441, 447 (5th Cir. 1996); Mannhalt, 847 F.2d at 581–84; 
Government of Virgin Islands v. Zepp, 748 F.2d 125, 136 (3d Cir. 1984).  
 257. U.S. v. Williams, 372 F.3d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 2004); U.S. v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 870 (2d 
Cir. 1983). 
 258. U.S. v. John Doe No. 1, 272 F.3d 116, 125 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 259. See, e.g., U.S. v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883, 890 (2d Cir. 1990); Solina v. U.S., 709 F.2d 160, 167 
(2d Cir. 1983).   
 260. See, e.g., Cancilla, 725 F.2d at 870.  Where the attorney is implicated in unrelated criminal 
conduct, the Second Circuit does not apply the per se rule.  See U.S. v. Levy, 25 F.3d 146, 157 n.8 (2d 
Cir. 1994); U.S. v. Aiello, 900 F.2d 528, 531 (2d Cir. 1990); Waterhouse v. Rodriguez, 848 F.2d 375, 
383 (2d Cir. 1988). 
 261. Williams, 372 F.3d at 102–03; see U.S. v. Kliti, 156 F.3d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1998).   
 262. Solina, 709 F.2d at 164. 
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The Second Circuit has applied this rule in several cases where an 
attorney was implicated in his client’s crimes.263  For example, in 
United States v. Fulton, the court held that there was a per se conflict 
where the attorney and client together conspired to import and 
distribute heroin.
264
   
During the trial in Fulton, a witness for the prosecution implicated 
defendant Fulton’s lead attorney in the same crime.265  Defendant 
Fulton was informed of the potential conflict but nonetheless elected 
to proceed with his lead attorney.
266
  Fulton was convicted.
267
  He 
then appealed.
 268
    
On review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit reversed the conviction holding that the conflict was a non-
waiveable, per se violation of the Sixth Amendment.  The court 
reasoned that the attorney’s “fear of, and desire to avoid, criminal 
charges . . . will affect virtually every aspect of his or her 
representation of the defendant” such that no waiver could be 
permissible.
269
  As the Second Circuit explained, any circumstance 
wherein “the attorney’s own interests diverge from those of the client 
presents the same core problem presented in the multiple 
representation cases:  the attorney’s fealty to the client is 
compromised.”270   
The Second Circuit has held that the conflict may be present even 
when the attorney has not yet been accused or indicted.
271
  In United 
States v. Cancilla, the attorney and his client were both involved in 
an insurance fraud scheme.
272
  Defendant Cancilla and his wife 
would insure automobiles that had already been damaged and then 
submit claims for accidents that never occurred.
273
  Although it was 
not fully revealed until after Cancilla was convicted, his attorney had 
a prior relationship with the automobile repair shop involved in the 
scheme.
274
  In fact, the attorney submitted false insurance claims for 
 
 263. See U.S. v. Fulton, 5 F.3d 605, 611 (2d Cir. 1993) ; Triana v. U.S., 205 F.3d 36, 42 (2d Cir. 
2000).    
 264. Fulton, 5 F.3d at 611–12. 
 265. Id. at 607. 
 266. Id. at 608.   
 267. Id. at 606.   
 268. Id. at 607. 
 269. Id. at 613. 
 270. Id. at 609.   
 271. Under Second Circuit law the issue of how much involvement the attorney must have in his 
client’s crime or how likely it is that the attorney will be indicted, tried, or convicted remains unsettled.   
 272. 725 F.2d 867, 868 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 273. Id.  
 274. Id.  
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his own vehicles.
275
   
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit held that defendant Cancilla did not need to prove prejudice 
under the Sullivan test.
276
  Instead, reversal of Cancilla’s conviction 
was automatic.  In so holding, the court noted the severity of the 
conflict—any “wrong step” by the attorney could have drawn 
unwarranted attention to the attorney.
277
  The court reasoned that this 
fear of attention and detection may have caused the attorney to keep a 
low profile, even if that resulted in a subpar defense of his client.  In 
the Second Circuit, an attorney who represents his co-conspirator 
client is grounds for the Holloway automatic reversal rule, not the 
Sullivan actual prejudice test.   
Most circuits do not so hold.
278
  Although the Second Circuit’s 
extension of the Holloway automatic reversal rule is a minority view, 
there is wisdom to this approach.  When an attorney is, or is likely to 
be, the subject of a criminal investigation, there is a significant 
temptation by the attorney to preference his own self-interest.  The 
attorney’s fear that evidence of his involvement will be disclosed 
could permeate every aspect of his client’s defense.  From discovery 
to plea deals, at every stage of litigation the attorney is likely to be 
overwhelmed by protecting himself even if it means sacrificing his 
client.  The seriousness of this type of conflict is difficult to ignore.  
When an attorney has conspired with his client, the resulting conflict 
creates precisely the type of unavoidable, un-waivable conflict that 
justifies automatic reversal.   
V. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S PER SE REVERSAL RULE IS JUSTIFIED IN THE 
CASE OF ATTORNEYS WHO REPRESENT THEIR CO-CONSPIRATOR 
CLIENTS   
Perhaps as a nod to the Second Circuit, the Mickens Court 
cautioned in dicta that some circuits might be applying too lenient a 
standard in different types of conflict of interest situations.  At least 
in the area of attorney co-conspirators, there are valid reasons for a 
lenient standard to apply.  The Mickens decision can be read to 
suggest that only conflicts arising from concurrent joint 
representation of co-defendants should be subject to a lenient 
standard.  Under such a reading, other conflicts, including those 
 
 275. Id.  
 276. Id. at 870–71.   
 277. Id. at 871. 
 278. See, e.g., U.S. v. Mikell, 344 Fed. Appx. 218, 229 (6th Cir. 2009); Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 
F.2d 576, 579–80 (9th Cir. 1988).   
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arising from attorney co-conspirators should be subject to the rules of 
Strickland or Sullivan.  By applying this standard, reversal would be 
granted only where there is a showing of “but for” causation or actual 
prejudice.  The most detrimental of all possible conflicts would be 
subject to one of the two the most rigorous standards.  Accordingly, 
many defendants would fail to meet this burden.   
As posited herein, there can be no greater interest than self-
presentation.  In the case of the criminal attorney, this interest is 
pitted squarely against the interest of the client.  Due to the unusual 
severity of this conflict, cases of this type should not be subject to the 
ineffective assistance of counsel tests in Stickland or Sullivan.  These 
cases should be subject to automatic reversal, as occurs in the Second 
Circuit.  When an attorney is implicated in the same criminal 
enterprise as the client he defendants, there should be no possibility 
of waiver by the client.  Nor should it matter whether the trial court 
had reason to inquire into the conflict.  When it is subsequently 
discovered that the client was represented by an attorney involved in 
his or her criminal conduct, the client should be granted reversal and 
a new trial without any need to show an adverse effect on 
representation.   
At least in the realm of fiction, the criminal attorney endures.  In 
2013, the AMC series Breaking Bad ended.
279
  It was almost 
immediately announced that a spin-off series would air in February, 
2015.
280
  This new series, entitlted “Better Call Saul” will focus on 
criminal attorney Saul Goodman.
281
   
As the popularity of Breaking Bad reveals, the concept of the 
criminal attorney captivates and entertains.  As argued herein, 
however, although the concept of the criminal attorney may seem 
like the exclusive province of screenwriters, there are real attorneys 
conspiring with their clients.  When a client is indicted and tried, and 
his attorney co-conspirator acts as defense counsel, there are 
significant constutional law implications that should not be ignored.   
Although no case involving a criminal attorney has yet reached the 
Court, there may come a time when a writ of ceriorari is granted in 
such a case.  When such a case presents itself, the Court will have an 
opportunity to clarify the appropriate standard for this unique type of 
conflict.  The Court may elect, as many lower courts have elected, to 
apply either the Sullivan “actual conflict” test or the Strickland “but 
for” causation test.  For the reasons discussed herein, such 
 
 279. See J. Hoberman, On the Road, and on the Run, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2014, at 16.   
 280. Hank Stuever, ‘Peter Pan’ storms NBC with Christopher Walken as Hook; ‘Comeback’ is 
coming . . . back, WASH. POST, July 15, 2014, at C02.   
 281. Id.   
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application would apply too lenient a standard to a very serious 
conflict of interest.  Cases of a criminal attorney are more akin to the 
conflicts requiring automatic reversal in Holloway and Wood.  An 
automatic reversal rule for attorney co-conspirators, like the one 
utilized in the Second Circuit, is more apt.    
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